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ABSTRACT 
This thesis concerns the effective and safe software reuse in safety-critical 
system-of-systems. Software reuse offers many unutilized benefits such as achieving 
rapid system development, saving resources and time, and keeping up technologically in 
an increasingly advancing global environment. System software needs to be designed for 
both reuse and safety, and available information needs to be shared effectively. We 
introduce a process neutral framework for software reuse in safety-critical system of 
systems. That framework consists of four elements: organizational factors, component 
attributes, component specification, and safety analysis. We developed a model (C5RA) 
to capture the relevant component information and assist in specification matching. We 
conducted a survey of software safety metrics, created metrics, and developed a ranking. 
We then applied the framework utilizing the reuse of a generic avionics software 
component. Our key findings are that congruence between all elements is required; 
software should posses certain attributes with metrics that support a safe design; software 
component information can be specified using C5RA; and a process identified a system-
of-systems hazard analysis for software reuse. The framework outlined provides a 
solution that enables effective software reuse in safety-critical system of systems.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE EVOLUTION OF SOFTWARE REUSE 
Software reuse evolved from rudimentary techniques, such as development of 
function calls in early programming languages (e.g., FORTRAN) and libraries of 
software routines for performing scientific calculations, to modern-day approaches to 
reuse that cover the entire software lifecycle and all software system artifacts.  For 
instance, there are now well established methods for reusing software architectures and 
design patterns.  The inclusion of high-level artifacts such as use cases and requirements 
has been in part due to the realization that decisions made early in the development 
process typically have a significant impact on software engineers’ ability to refine the 
these artifacts into a machine interpretable or executable system.  Software reuse relies on 
preplanning to enact a sustainable reuse program that meets the needs of the 
organizations involved in a system development project.  Preplanning distinguishes 
software reuse from software salvage, an unsystematic, opportunistic approach to using 
software system artifacts not developed with reuse in mind. 
Another driver for continued innovation in software reuse is what has been 
referred to as the “software crisis”1: the imbalance between the explosive growth in 
software demand and both lagging software development productivity and the shortage in 
the supply of software professionals. This “software crisis” is just as apropos today as it 
has been over the past forty years of software engineering. The success rate of delivering 
or maintaining information systems on schedule, at cost, and within performance 
constraints has not improved since the 1970s, as evidenced by the results of studies 
reported by the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the Standish Group.  When 
applied in an appropriate manner, software reuse provides a means for improving 
software quality, increasing development productivity, shortening time-to-market (i.e., 
creating competitive advantage), achieving consistent application functionality, reducing 
                                                 
1 NATO Software Engineering Conference, NATO Science Committee, Garmisch, Germany, 7-11 
October 1968.  
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risk of cost and schedule overruns, improving validation of user requirements through 
prototyping, leveraging of technical skills and knowledge, and avoiding the inclination to 
“reinvent the wheel” (e.g., a survey performed in 1983 found that 85% of software 
developed was not unique2). 
In 2003, U.S. Department of the Navy adopted an open architecture initiative3 to 
realize some of the aforementioned improvements in software development. The Navy’s 
open architecture is a multi-faceted strategy providing a framework for developing joint 
interoperable systems that adapt and exploit open-system design principles. This 
framework includes a set of principles, processes, and best practices that: provide more 
opportunities for competition and innovation; rapidly field affordable, interoperable 
systems; minimize total ownership cost; optimize total system performance; yield 
systems that are easily developed and upgradeable; and achieve component software 
reuse. Thus, there is a recognized need to achieve greater software component reuse, 
which will subsequently support the achievement of other outcomes of the Navy 
initiative.  There is also the need to avoid software duplication, save resources, and get 
more out of existing resources to keep Navy and the other U.S. services positioned as the 
best in the world at an acceptable cost.  
Without software reuse, it is unlikely that an organization will achieve a 
technological advantage or be at the cutting edge of technology development because it 
will simply take too long or be too costly to achieve that position via either green-fields 
development (i.e., starting from scratch) or software salvage.   
Although the rationale for software reuse is sound, there are significant challenges 
to applying reuse in the development of safety-critical applications in a system of 
systems. A system of systems is an amalgamation of legacy systems and developing 
systems that provide an enhanced capability greater than that of any of the individual 
                                                 
2 E.J. Joyce., Reusable Software: Passage to Productivity. Datamation, Volume 34, Number 18, 
Spetember 15, 1988, p. 98. 
3 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 2003. 
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systems within the system of systems.4 System of systems are a great departure from 
standalone systems. There is uncertainty and risk associated with assumptions about the 
interfaces between the component systems and issues of system interoperability. Also 
certain rules and restrictions apply to the reuse of software in safety critical systems. 
Planning for reuse and determining the appropriateness of reuse in a safety-critical 
system of systems represent a significant challenge because of the large number of 
potential system configurations, their non-stationary position, the associated emergent 
hazards, and derived safety requirements. Furthermore, safety is a system property and 
thus reused software will impact on the system safety.  
There are also challenges associated with using non developmental items (NDIs) 
in a system of systems. The challenges arise because a single stakeholder does not control 
these individual systems and these systems may be used in plug-and-play arrangements, 
leading to multiple possible configurations, which will result in emergent safety 
properties and requirements.   
Overcoming the reusability challenges means that more software will be reused, 
software development productivity will increase and the quality of the software and 
system will improve. Even after applying these rules you do not necessarily have a safe 
design, because even the best design cannot fully isolate the safety critical functionality 
from the reused component or non-developmental item. This currently limits the extent 
that software can be reused in safety-critical systems, including that in a system of 
systems. A software component that possesses certain essential attributes that are 
explicitly revealed and is classified appropriately will be more readily available for use 
and reuse in a safety-critical system of systems. A framework describing these software 
component requirements will facilitate effective reuse in safety-critical system of 
systems, creating advantages for both the U.S. and Australian defense communities in 
developing safety-critical systems. Many military systems today are both safety critical 
and composed of legacy and new development systems, such as the U.S. Ballistic Missile 
Defense System.  
                                                 
4 D.S. Caffall., J.B. Michael., Architectural Framework for a System-of-Systems, in Proc of the IEEE 
International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Volume 2,  10-12 Oct 2005, p1876. 
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B. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
1. Software Reuse 
Software reuse is the use of existing software artifacts in the development of other 
software artifacts with the goal of improving productivity and quality, among other 
factors.5 Software reuse can also be described as the process of leveraging components 
from one system or environment for use in other systems or environments with no or 
minimal change to the component. Environment in this case refers to the context of use of 
the system, such as the classic example of reusing the guidance and control software from 
Arianne 4 in Arianne 5 or the case of software evolution, where the requirements and 
context of a system changes with changes in its mission. Software reuse differs from 
software salvage in that it occurs in a systematic way with a degree of preplanning for 
future use. Software reuse results from effective foresight during development, providing 
an investment in that future use. Conversely, software salvage is an unsystematic 
opportunistic approach to using software-system artifacts that were not developed with 
reuse in mind. Software artifacts are the products or byproducts of the software 
development process that comprise possible candidates for reuse. Lim identifies ten types 
of software artifacts that may be reused. They are: 
1. Architectures  6.  Estimates  
2. Source Code  7.  Human Interfaces 
3. Data   8.  Plans 
4. Designs  9. Requirements 
5. Documentation 10. Test Cases  
 
According to Lim, a software component is a set of software artifacts that 
comprise a coherent module. It may contain many of the artifacts described above.6 
There are, however, many different definitions for a software component. Braude defines 
a software component as a software collection used without alteration, under the goal of 
                                                 
5 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 
Organization for Reusable Components, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998, p7. 
6 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 
Organization for Reusable Components, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998, p539.  
 5
reuse and as the vehicle for delivering reuse.7 Alternatively, Larman states that a 
component represents a modular part of a system that encapsulates its contents and whose 
manifestation is replaceable within its environment.8  Pressman, on the other hand, 
defines a software component as a unit of composition with contractually specified and 
explicit context dependencies only.9 Although there may be many different definitions, 
there is much commonality among them. In this thesis we define a software component 
as a collection of software comprising a module with a well-defined purpose that may be 
used with no or minimal alteration.      
Lim identifies the many benefits of software reuse as: 
• Improved software quality 
• Increased development productivity 
• Shortened time to market 
• Consistent application functionality 
• Reduced risk of cost and schedule overruns 
• Allows prototyping for validating user requirements 
• Leveraging of technical skills and knowledge10  
Software reuse, once established, enables an organization to accomplish more 
without additional resources. This is important for both businesses trying to gain and 
maintain a competitive advantage and public sector entities attempting to acquire the best 
systems at the least cost. Software reuse allows an organization to generate competitive 
advantage and to avoid duplicating past efforts. Furthermore, it is one method for 
mitigating the software crisis. Software reuse is a means for an organization to leverage  
 
 
                                                 
7 E. Braude., Software Design: From Programming to Architecture, Hoboken, NJ.: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2004, p385.  
8 C.Larman., Applying UML and Patterns, An Introduction to Object-Oriented Analysis and Design 
and Iterative Development, Third Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Pearson Education, 2005, p654. 
9 R.S. Pressman., Software Engineering A Practitioner’s Approach, Sixth Edition, New York, NY.: 
McGraw-Hill, 2005, p817. 
10 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 
Organization for Reusable Components, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998, p102.  
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past successes through organizational learning and institutional memory. Software reuse 
represents a strategy for meeting the challenges of a rapidly changing complex 
environment.   
These benefits, however, may not be realized if reuse is not implemented 
effectively. For example, reusing a software component that subsequently does not meet 
the requirements, which may not be evident until verification and validation activities, 
may involve increased work and costs because new software may be developed later than 
originally intended. Without organizational support for reuse, including incentives for 
reuse, these benefits may be overlooked and go largely unrealizable. 
2. System Safety 
Safety is defined as freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, 
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the 
environment.11  
In other words, safety is freedom from conditions that cause accidents (mishaps). 
Furthermore, safety is the execution of a software product in a system without causing 
the system to exist in a hazardous state.12 
MIL-STD-882Ddefines system safety as:  
the application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and 
techniques to achieve acceptable mishap risk, within the constraints of 
operational effectiveness and suitability, time, and cost, throughout all 
phases of the system life cycle.13 
Furthermore, MIL-STD-882D defines system safety engineering as: 
An engineering discipline that employs specialized professional 
knowledge and skills in applying scientific and engineering principles, 
                                                 
11 Department of Defense, Standard Practice for System Safety, MIL-STD-882D, 10 February 2000. 
12 R. Singh., A Systematic Approach to Software Safety, in Proc of the sixth Asia Pacific Software 
Engineering Conference (APSEC ’99), 1999. 
13 Department of Defense, Standard Practice for System Safety, MIL-STD-882D, 10 February 2000. 
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criteria, and techniques to identify and eliminate hazards, in order to 
reduce the associated mishap risk.14 
In these cases MIL-STD-882D defines a hazard as: 
Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to 
personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or 
damage to the environment.15 
A hazard can also be defined as a source of potential harm16 or a prerequisite to a 
mishap or accident.  
The system safety process is a specific application of the risk management 
process to the system safety domain where instead of risk, the terms hazard and mishap 
risk are used. The objective of system safety is to achieve an acceptable mishap risk 
through a systematic approach of hazard analysis, risk assessment, and risk 
management.17 Figure 1 illustrates the risk management process as defined in the 
Australian and New Zealand standard AS 4360.18   
                                                 
14 Department of Defense, Standard Practice for System Safety, MIL-STD-882D, 10 February 2000. 
15 Department of Defense, Standard Practice for System Safety, MIL-STD-882D, 10 February 2000, 
p2. 
16 AS/NZS 4360:2004. Australian / New Zealand Standard. Risk Management, p3. 
17 Department of Defense, Standard Practice for System Safety, MIL-STD-882D, 10 February 2000, 
p3. 
18 AS/NZS 4360:2004. Australian / New Zealand Standard. Risk Management. 
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Figure 1.   AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk Management Process Overview 
The system safety process as defined by MIL-STD-882D is as follows: 
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Figure 2.   MIL-STD-882D System Safety Process 
Both processes are similar, involving a number of common steps. Neither process 
has a way of guaranteeing that all relevant risks or hazards will be identified, which is 
why sub-processes are required to ensure that those relevant risks or hazards are 
identified so they can be treated.    
3. Software Safety 
The discipline of software safety engineering is the systematic approach to 
identifying, analyzing, and tracking software mitigation and control of hazards and 
hazardous functions (e.g., data and commands) to ensure safer software operation within 
a system.19 
                                                 
19 Overview of Software Safety, NASA Software Safety, May 2007, http://sw-
assurance.gsfc.nasa.gov/disciplines/safety/index.php. 
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Software system safety is a subset of system safety and, according to Leveson, 
“implies that the software will execute within a system context without contributing to 
hazards.”20 Software safety is a discipline within system safety engineering that focuses 
on the system’s software and its interactions with the hardware and human operators. 
Software itself cannot cause harm, except possibly emotional harm or stress (nerves) to 
those involved in its development; however, through its interactions with hardware it can 
cause hazards that may result in mishaps. Software safety is an engineering and 
management approach to ensuring that the software minimizes the system safety risk to 
an acceptable level while maintaining the effectiveness of the software and system. It is 
focused on meeting safety requirements. The purpose of system safety and software 
safety is to identify and mitigate hazards associated with the operation and maintenance 
of the system and software respectively and to define the residual risk, based on success 
of the controls implemented.21 
Software safety is concerned with both removing defects in software artifacts for 
which there would be hazardous consequences and ensuring the system’s specification 
adequately captures the safety requirements. Software safety is an ongoing process as the 
software and operational environment evolves.     
4.  Safety Critical Software 
Safety critical is a term applied to any condition, event, operation, process, or 
item whose proper recognition, control, performance, or tolerance is essential to safe 
system operation and support (e.g., safety critical function, safety critical path, or safety 
critical component).22 
                                                 
20 N. Leveson., Safeware: System Safety and Computers. Addison Wesley, Boston, 1995.  
21 V. Basili., K. Dangle., L. Esker., F. Marotta., Gaining Early Insight into Software Safety: Measures 
of Potential Problems and Risks, in Proc of the Systems & Software Technology Conference, June 2007, 
p3.  
22 Department of Defense, Standard Practice for System Safety, MIL-STD-882D, 10 February 2000. 
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According to NASA,23 software is safety critical if it meets at least one of the 
following criteria: 
1. Resides in a safety-critical system (as determined by a hazard 
analysis) and at least one of the following: 
a. Causes or contributes to a hazard 
b. Provides control or mitigation for hazards 
c. Controls safety-critical functions 
d. Processes safety-critical commands or data 
e. Detects and reports, or takes corrective action, if the system 
reaches a specific hazardous state 
f. Mitigates damage if a hazard occurs 
g. Resides on the same system (processor) as safety-critical 
software 
2. Processes data or analyzes trends that lead directly to safety 
decisions (e.g., determining when to turn power off to wind tunnel to 
prevent system destruction) 
3. Provides full or partial verification or validation of safety-critical 
systems, including hardware or software subsystems. 
A safety critical function is any function, whether hardware, software, operator, or 
combination thereof, that directly influences a hazard or hazardous situation. 
Furthermore, it is any function whose improper functioning could result in a hazard in 
which improper functioning includes failure modes, out of tolerance conditions, timing 
error or problems (e.g., data latency), or other errors.24 
                                                 
23 Overview of Software Safety, NASA Software Safety, May 2007, http://sw-
assurance.gsfc.nasa.gov/disciplines/safety/index.php. 
24 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 
Organization for Reusable Components, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998. 
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In the context of safety critical software, there is the rule that reused software or 
non-developmental items (NDI), be it COTS, GOTS, MOTS25 or legacy software, may 
not initiate, sustain, or prevent occurrence of a safety critical function unless the NDI has 
been evaluated to the same level as a developmental software component. This rule 
results from the reality that not enough information is typically provided on reusable 
software components and that there is not a standard or shared understanding to describe 
what that should be. Furthermore, safety is a system property, and thus reused software 
will impact system safety; it is dependent on the interfaces and interactions with the 
system. Thus, this suggests that there will always be a requirement for analysis of the 
component in its intended environment. This is likely to involve operational testing and is 
dependent on the safety requirements. 
5. Safety Critical Environment 
A safety critical environment is an environment in which there are potential 
hazards or hazardous situations or where proper system functioning is essential for safe 
operation. 
6. System of Systems 
A system of systems is an amalgamation of legacy systems and developing 
systems that provides an enhanced capability greater than that of any of the individual 
systems within the system of systems.26 It represents a natural evolution from systems 
and systems development to now integrating several systems to form a greater system for 
the accomplishment of specific objectives.   
System of systems represent a significant departure from standalone systems as 
their components are individual systems often with a high level of autonomy whereas 
system components, subsystems are often unable to operate in isolation from the other 
subsystems that compose the system. Furthermore, system of systems development is not 
                                                 
25 Commercial off the Shelf (COTS), Government off the Shelf (GOTS), and Modified off the Shelf 
(MOTS). 
26 D.S. Caffall., J.B. Michael., Architectural Framework for a System-of-Systems, in Proc of the IEEE 
International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Volume 2,  10-12 Oct 2005, p1876. 
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just a larger version of systems development; it represents an area of greater uncertainty 
and risk associated with assumptions and unknowns of the interfaces between the 
component systems. The component systems are often developed to meet requirements 
and constraints that are different from those of the system of systems. It is often the case 
in system of systems development that legacy systems are integrated with new systems 
and thus not all system of systems components were designed to optimize the 
performance or dependability of the system of systems or to conform to required 
interface and interoperability specifications.  
Example system of systems are the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS) and the U.S. Army’s Future Combat System (FCS). The U.S. Commercial and 
Military Aviation systems could be described as further system of systems examples.   
7. Safety-Critical System of Systems 
A safety-critical system of systems is a system of systems operating in an 
environment in which there are hazards or hazardous situations or where proper system 
functioning is essential for safe operation within a system of systems. The environment 
represents the context in which the system will be used and in the case of a system of 
systems, there may be many different contexts of use. These many contexts of use will 
have a significant affect on safety because safety is context dependent. Safety is a 
function of the context of use, against which hazards can be identified.   
Commercial and military aviation could be described as a safety-critical system of 
systems. In the case of commercial and military aviation, a number of different systems 
operate cohesively for a common purpose where safety is of paramount importance.     
8.  Framework for Software Reuse 
Successful software reuse requires a holistic, systematic, multi-disciplinary 
approach which is matched to the specific context of use. I intend to establish a 
framework within which software reuse can be enabled and supported and the probability 
of a successful outcome increased in a safety-critical system of systems context.  
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This framework requires the integration of a number of factors to be successful.  
Much of the success of any reuse program can be attributed to the amount of 
information available on a potential reuse candidate, the ability to search and locate that 
information, and supportive organizational policies which encourage reuse. To a lesser  
degree, success can also be attributed to institutionalized memory based on past 
experiences employing software reuse that will contribute to future organizational 
policies on software reuse.   
This framework will establish the organizational policy and culture requirements, 
the information required on a reusable software component and its possible organization, 
metrics that are of interest, requirements from a regulator or certification authority’s 
perspective, and the hazard analysis that must occur to make software reuse a success in 
safety-critical system of systems. 
This thesis will focus on compositional reuse rather than generative reuse, as 
described by Lim.27 Generative reuse software is a tool for producing software artifacts 
that may be compositionally reused; however, the framework may provide value in that 
area too.   
Chapter II will provide an overview of standard DO-178B, Software 
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, which will provide the 
context for discussion of an Advisory Circular on Reusable Software Components 
(AC20-148) issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Advisory 
Circular on Reusable Software Components provides an example of how reuse is 
encouraged and a process established to make it more prevalent and ubiquitous in the 
U.S. aviation community.  
Chapter III introduces the framework for software reuse in safety-critical system 
of systems, the metrics relevant to safety, reuse metrics, regulator needs, and their 
influence on elements of the framework. Chapter IV provides an example of how to 
apply the framework, and Chapter V draws some conclusions and discusses future work.    
                                                 
27 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 
Organization for Reusable Components, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998, p397. 
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II. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION APPROACH 
TO SOFTWARE REUSE 
A. DO-178B SOFTWARE CONSIDERATIONS IN AIRBORNE SYSTEMS 
AND EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION 
1. Overview 
RTCA/DO-178B28 Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification is a contemporary software assurance standard that is highly regarded within 
the aviation community. It is the preferred standard for software assurance for safety 
related airborne software in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the U.S. Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and is used by many others developing or regulating 
airborne software. DO-178B provides guidelines on software production for airborne 
systems and equipment. The standard could be applied across application domains but 
some aspects are avionics specific.  
DO-178B applies to the assurance and certification of all software requirements 
and not just those that are safety related. In DO-178B, two main entities are described, 
those being the Certification Authority and the Applicant. The Certification Authority is 
the organization or person granting approval on behalf of the country responsible for 
aircraft or engine certification29 and is the organization that defines certification 
requirements, conducts reviews of compliance with safety requirements, and certifies 
compliance with the requirements. The Applicant is the person or organization seeking 
approval from the Certification Authority and therefore is the party responsible for 
providing the argument and evidence for certification. The FAA uses DO-178B when 
certifying airborne software, and it is thus the standard that developers, integrators, and 
users of airborne software must comply with to achieve certification from the FAA. DO-
178B is also the preferred standard of the ADF for assurance of airborne software.    
                                                 
28 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, DO-178B / ED-12B, Software Considerations in 
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, Washington D.C., 1 December 1992. 
29 Ibid., p. 12.  
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B. FAA AC20-148 REUSABLE SOFTWARE COMPONENTS (RSC) 
1. Overview 
According to Wlad, no formal guidance or standard exists that maximizes the 
utility of software reuse in any industry.30 For the development of software for use in 
safety-critical system of systems, a the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a 
relatively new policy to provide some guidance on the certification requirements when an 
already certified software component is to be reused, but this does not focus on the design 
for reuse or those inherent attributes that the software component must exhibit to 
facilitate effective reuse. Wlad asserts that this new policy will cause a major shift in how 
software is reused in safety critical systems. The new policy is a Reusable Software 
Components Advisory Circular (AC20-148) published in 2004. This circular details the 
approach and documentation necessary for systematic reuse of software components that 
meet the guidelines of DO-178B. AC20-148 now allows for acceptance of software 
independent of a hardware platform, enabling developers to take certification credit on 
one project and apply it to future projects.  
The FAA asserts that this approach is one acceptable means of compliance but not 
the only one to gain acceptance or credit for the reuse of a software component. As this is 
an advisory circular, it is not mandatory nor does it constitute a regulation. This AC only 
applies when all stakeholders agree that the software component is reusable because 
meeting the policy requirements is likely to require additional effort and resources. The 
AC may apply to verification and development tools, although the FAA plans to cover 
this specifically in future guidance. The motivation for this guidance comes from the 
economic incentives of reuse, encouraging software developers to develop reusable 
software components (RSCs) that can be integrated into many systems. DO-178B based 
verification of systems is known to be an expensive endeavor. Providing a mechanism for 
taking credit on one project and using it on another via use of an RSC reduces both 
                                                 
30 J. Wlad., Software Reuse in Safety critical Airborne Systems, in Proc of 25th Digital Avionics 
Systems Conference, Oct 15, 2006, p. 6C5-1. 
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certification cost, time, and risk. The guidance in the AC ensures that systems using 
RSCs meet all applicable RTCA/DO-178B objectives.    
The FAA may grant acceptance of an RSC provided all stakeholders comply with 
the advisory circular and that no installation, safety, operational, functional, or 
performance concerns are identified. Essentially this AC increases the certification 
requirements and documentation for the component in the first instance, making it easier 
for subsequent uses of the software component. The AC makes a good point in that 
acceptance of the RSC for one project does not guarantee acceptance on a later project as 
applicants must consider installation, safety, operational, functional, and performance 
issues for each project. This is important because safety is a system property. Just 
because there are no safety issues in one environment does not preclude them from 
existing in the new environment, which is particularly important in a system of systems. 
In other words, the RSC is not to be reused blindly and should be assessed for each 
project or environment. The approach identified in the AC requires a close working 
relationship between the FAA, the developer, and other stakeholders in addition to the 
provision of evidence to support the argument that the RSC satisfies all DO-178B 
objectives throughout the development of the system. Table 1 shows the failure 
conditions of the safety requirements that have been allocated to software as the source 
and the number of objectives that require evidence. For example, a software failure 
condition that is catastrophic receives a level of A and requires evidence to support 66 







Catastrophic Level A 66 
Hazardous / 
Severe - Major Level B 65 
Major Level C 57 
Minor Level D 28 
Table 1.   178B Software Levels 
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The advisory circular recognizes that on a project the developer, integrator, and 
applicant for an RSC may be different, and even when an applicant plays all three roles, 
there needs to be a process for communicating and transferring accepted data among the 
relevant stakeholders. The advisory circular addresses that communication and transfer of 
data and identifies what information each party to the RSC must produce. The advisory 
circular recognizes the need for a greater level of DO-178B compliance and evidence 
thereof through documentation when applying for acceptance of an RSC. The advisory 
circular is also more specific than DO-178B as to what the DO-178B deliverables should 
contain to comply with the advisory circular. Table 2 lists the DO-178B deliverables 
required for certification.  
 
Plan for Software Aspects of Certification  
Software Development Plan  
Software Verification Plan  
Software Configuration Management Plan  
Software Quality Assurance Plan  
Software Standards (Reqs/Design/Code)  
Software Requirements  
Design description  
Source code  
Review results  
Test procedures/Test results  
 Software Life Cycle Environment Index  
Software Configuration Index  
Problem reports  
Software Configuration Management records  
Software Quality Assurance records  
Software Accomplishment Summary  
Table 2.   DO-178B Deliverables 
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The advisory circular also describes the data requirements that the developer must 
provide to the integrator or applicant. As an example, data requirements include failure 
conditions, safety features, protection mechanisms, architecture, limitations, software 
levels, interface specifications, and intended use of the RSC. Furthermore, open problem 
reports on the RSC and analysis of any potential functional, operational, performance, 
and safety effects must be provided; this is particularly important in assessing the 
appropriateness for a particular context of use and in transferring safety information. 
Another positive approach taken in the advisory circular is that regardless of any legal 
and proprietary issues and agreements about the delivery of software life cycle data (or 
artifacts) between the applicant and the developer, the data must be available for the 
certification authority or authorized designee’s review and inspection. This places the 
interest of public safety above all other concerns. This means that complete information 
is disclosed to the certification authority even if the applicant or integrator does not have 
access to it, overcoming the potential adverse impact proprietary protection may place on 
safety.  
The FAA also requires that the developer submit a data sheet for the RSC which 
must concisely summarize: 
• RSC functions  
• Limitations  
• Analysis of potential interface safety concerns   
• Assumptions   
• Configuration   
• Supporting data 
• Open problem reports  
• Software characteristics  
• Other relevant information that supports the integrator’s or applicant’s use 
of the RSC 
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This data sheet also assists in increasing the understandability of the software 
component, characterizing what information is deemed important. There are also 
provisions and requirements placed on the developer for identifying and maintaining data 
to support changes to the RSC. 
Military aviation regulators could take advantage of the approach described in the 
advisory circular when full information disclosure may not be achievable or required with 
all stakeholders but that information is made available to the regulator. Taking the 
approach identified in the AC may reduce some of the verification activities required on 
subsequent projects and reduce the requirement to redo DO-178B certification activities. 
The advisory circular also identifies potential software reuse issues and provides a 
process for recertification when changes are made to an RSC.  
Overall the advisory circular provides thorough and systematic guidance for the 
acceptance and credit for reuse of a reusable software component. The advisory circular 
specifies the process, the information needs of all parties, some potential reuse problems, 
and how to gain recertification of an RSC after changes to it are made. The advisory 
circular recommends the use of DO-178B as the relevant standard for initial and future 
compliance; however, this is not mandatory but it would be more difficult if another 
standard was used. It recognizes the importance of a design for reuse approach and the 
allocation of appropriate resources to gain credit for the early work when reused. Just like 
safety and other issues, consideration of reuse issues as early as possible in the system 
development is much more efficient in assuring effective reuse than delaying 
consideration until after many of the design and development decisions have been made.  
A deficiency of the advisory circular is that it does not specifically refer to the use 
of hazard analysis, which is a cornerstone of safety engineering, nor what the information 
requirements for providing evidence to support a safety case in the new context of use. A 
safety case sets out the safety justification for the system and contains a record of all the 
safety activities associated with a system throughout its life.31 The advisory circular does  
 
                                                 
31 N. Storey., Safety-Critical Computer Systems, New York, NY.: Addison-Wesley, 1996, p364. 
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recommend that safety must be considered and addressed, which may be the authors’ way 
of providing the evidence in support of the safety case for the component; however, this 
was not explicit.  
As this advisory circular is not mandatory and represents guidance only, but refers 
to DO-178B as the certification basis, it must be recognized that this approach will be 
seen as the preferred and most common way. The advisory circular does not preclude the 
use of other ways of achieving RSC certification; however, it makes compliance with 
other standards more arduous by specifically referring to DO-178B, thereby perpetuating 
and encouraging its use. Thus this advisory circular becomes a de facto standard for 
reusable software component certification within U.S. civil aviation.  The advisory 
circular is the FAA’s recognition that reusable software components are important and a 
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III. FRAMEWORK FOR SOFTWARE REUSE IN SAFETY-
CRITICAL SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
A. OVERVIEW 
According to Lim, software reuse is most effective when practiced 
systematically.32 In order to achieve a systematic approach that is also holistic and 
multidisciplinary, a framework for software reuse in safety-critical system of systems is 
required for identifying the key aspects, factors, and influencers on software reuse and for 
generating discussion on them. It is therefore proposed that the successful application of 
software reuse in a systematic approach depends on the following four factors (or pillars): 
1. Organizational Factors (Enabler or Foundation). 
2. Reusable software component attributes (Quality). 
3. Reusable software component specification (Knowledge Capture and Search 
Effectiveness). 
4. Safety Analysis (Environmental Match).  
This chapter will explore these four factors of software reuse in detail.  
The particular context of safety-critical system of systems places greater 
emphasis, in particular, on factors 2 and 4 of the framework. What differentiates this 
framework from a framework for reuse in general is the level of detail in each element 
and that a safety or hazard analysis and in particular a system-of-systems hazard analysis 
is essential.  
The framework depicted in figure 3 shows how the factors (or pillars) contribute 
to achieving effective software reuse in safety-critical system of systems. In this case, the 
framework refers to the supporting structure for software reuse. It is process neutral and 
represents the desired elements for successful software reuse.  
                                                 
32 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 






Figure 3.   Framework for Software Reuse in Safety-Critical System of Systems  
This framework focuses on compositional reuse, the construction of new software 
products by assembling existing reusable artifacts, rather than generative reuse. The 
framework, however, may provide value for the latter.  
The needs and policies of the regulator will have an impact on any reuse program 
and will largely dictate the activities required and documentation necessary to obtain the 
benefits of software reuse. Example regulators include the FAA for civilian aviation in 
Safety-Critical 
System of Systems 
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the United States, the Naval Air Systems Command for U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. 
Marine Corps (USMC) aviation, and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for military 
aviation in Australia. The specific regulator for the safety-critical system of systems will 
have influence on the framework as evident in the discussion of the FAA’s influence on 
software reuse through its guidance (Advisory Circular 20-148).  
B. ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 
Organizational factors represent the enabling and supporting functions within an 
organization that must exist to achieve successful software reuse in any context. These 
non-technical, management factors have significant influence on any software reuse 
activity and if not aligned appropriately, can dramatically affect the success of any 
proposed software reuse. Effective software reuse requires a strong commitment from 
senior management, a documented process that supports the organization’s mission, a 
software reuse policy, and a delegated software reuse team. The significant factors 
affecting software reuse from an organizational perspective fall into the following 
categories: culture; people; structure; reuse domain; reuse potential; reuse capability; 
policies, processes and practices; and reuse metrics.  
1. Culture   
Organizational culture is defined as "consciously held notions shared by members 
that most directly influence their attitudes and behaviors.”33 These notions may include 
behavioral norms, values, beliefs, rituals, symbols, and behaviors that employees believe 
are expected of them to fit in and survive in an organization. Organizational culture can 
also be thought of as the leadership and management style, employee involvement and 
participation, and the customs and norms of an organization. These have a significant 
affect on the performance of an organization, which subsequently affects software reuse 
efforts. If those closely held notions within an organization are not conducive to software 
reuse, then it will be difficult for the organization to effectively reuse software. If the 
                                                 
33 R.H. Kilmann., M.J. Saxton., R. Serpa., Gaining Control of the Corporate Culture, Jossey Bass 
Business and management Series, San Francisco, CA.: 1985. 
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leadership and management style promotes reuse, this can aid in the successful 
implementation of a reuse program. A supportive organizational culture cannot guarantee 
the success of software reuse.. The lack of a supportive organizational culture, however, 
will almost certainly guarantee failure. The leadership and management of an 
organization have a significant influence in this regard, and they must both buy into 
software reuse and promote its benefits throughout the organization.  
It is not easy to change an organizational culture, because this requires changing 
the ingrained ways of that which defines the organization, but change is necessary if 
software reuse is to be successful and implemented where required. Members of the 
organization with a stake in software development must buy in to the concept of software 
reuse and understand its purpose for it to be a success across the organization. For 
software reuse to be implemented successfully, it is essential that there be a culture of 
cooperation and collaboration between stakeholders of the system of systems to ensure all 
relevant issues are considered in a timely and effective manner.  In the context of safety-
critical system of systems what is desired is a safety culture that permeates all 
organizations that contribute to the system of systems. This reflects the ideal and may not 
be achievable in reality. A safety and reuse champion is required who will educate, 
influence, and align the other stakeholders to achieve the necessary organizational 
culture.          
2. People  
People are a key component in the implementation of software reuse in an 
organization. They must be motivated to reuse with the requisite support to enable them 
to do so. People must understand the purpose for reusing software and the way it is to 
occur. Incentives to encourage reuse must be used to affect attitudinal changes towards its 
practice. Without any one of these, the best efforts may come undone.  
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Furthermore, the right people need to be placed in the right positions to have a 
positive impact on the software reuse efforts of an organization. Possible positions could 
include:34 
a. Reuse Champion, 
b. Domain Analyst, 
c. Domain Expert, 
d. Domain Workproduct Manager, 
e. Reuse Engineer, 
f. Reuse Analyst, 
g. Reuse Economist/Metrician, 
h. Librarian, and 
i. Reuse Manager. 
If software reuse is to be successful, all the preceding roles should be played in 
large and in small organizations; however, you could have different numbers of people 
responsible for each position. For example, you may have one person for each position; 
one person fulfilling more than one position; or the responsibilities of each position being 
fulfilled by a team of people. It is essential for an effective reuse program to select the 
right staff for each position and educate, train, and motivate them.  
A change in attitude and culture is important for long-term reuse success. The 
means for achieving a change in attitude and culture include education and training along 
with communication of the purpose of the reuse initiative. It is often the lack of 
communicating the goals of the reuse initiative that lets down the initiative and prevents 
it from being successful. Good management of the people filling the position cannot be  
 
 
                                                 
34 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 
Organization for Reusable Components, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998, pp225-227. 
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overstated in order to achieve success in software reuse.  All the people responsible for 
software development and maintenance have a role in successfully implementing 
software reuse.  
3. Structure 
The typical organizational structures, such as functional, project, matrix, and 
combinations thereof, may be used for reuse. Each structure has its advantages and 
disadvantages; these are dependent on the context for reuse. The best structure to apply 
will depend on the characteristics of the organization, the reuse strategy, and the 
environment that it will occur in. It is important to choose the right organizational 
structure that will deliver the reuse strategy given the organizational characteristics and 
operating environment. In safety-critical system of systems in which component quality 
and adherence to safety requirements is critical for software reuse, the best organizational 
structure may be a functional organization, where there is consistency in personnel, 
greater retention of corporate knowledge (or institutional memory), and the ability to 
centralize reuse efforts and efficiently manage them. Furthermore, under a functional 
organization it is more likely that common standards and methods will be reinforced and 
applied to the particular reusable artifacts in each functional area. However, just as there 
is the potential for greater quality and consistency among particular reusable artifacts, the 
functional structure may not be as responsive to customer needs as the other 
organizational structures and suffer from coordination problems between the functional 
departments of the reusable artifacts thus creating issues when components are to be 
reused. An organization does not necessarily structure itself based on what is best for 
reuse, so that structure may not be suitable in all cases.  In structuring an organization for 
reuse, it is also important to ensure that there are reuse departments responsible for the 
management of the reusable artifacts. These departments will maintain software 
repositories. An ecosystem supporting reused software in an organization is important.35 
 
                                                 




4. Reuse Domain                                                
The market segment the organization is serving, the types of products the 
organization produces, or the public sector the organization is in often define the reuse 
domain. This influences what form software reuse should take and how it is performed. 
Competition and regulation within the domain of reuse will shape software reuse, define 
what is involved, motivate its use, and impact on its ultimate success. A stable operating 
domain for the organization will assist in making reuse decisions and in exploiting reuse 
to its full potential. A domain characterized by frequent disruptive technologies may 
provide little impetus for establishing or investing in a software reuse program.     
5. Reuse Potential 
Lim refers to a reuse potential and aptitude model36 to help firms identify their 
potential for reuse success. This model is based on the assumption that the organization 
must possess the requisite potential for reuse as well as the ability to successfully exploit 
that potential. Reuse potential represents the latent redundancies and opportunities within 
and across domains which, when combined with proper organizational ability, can 
become actual reuse.37  
Latent competencies or opportunities must exist for the organization in order to 
have reuse potential. A number of organizational characteristics influence reuse potential 
and provide the supporting basis for future reuse.      
6. Reuse Capability 
In order to recognize reuse potential, an organization must possess the capability 
to exploit the potential. Reuse aptitude (capability) refers to the requisite ability or 
capacity to exploit the reuse potential.38 This aptitude, capacity, or capability refers to the 
ability to turn potential into reality and consists of the organizational characteristics, 
                                                 
36 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 
Organization for Reusable Components, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998, pp 75. 
37 Ibid., p. 75. 
38 Ibid., p. 78. 
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competencies, resources, or access to resources in order to implement software reuse. 
Software reuse involves an investment and effort upfront, which can be up to forty 
percent more than software written without reuse in mind (not to mention the costs of 
establishing a reuse program initially).39 Moreover, an organization requires those 
additional resources at the right time in order to implement reuse. If an organization does 
not have the resources or access to resources when required, it will not be able to 
successfully implement a reuse program and fulfill its reuse potential. The specific reuse 
capabilities required are referred to throughout this chapter.   
7. Policies, Processes and Practices  
The members of an organization must understand the purpose of software reuse 
and develop policies, processes, and practices that are supportive of reuse. The policies, 
processes, and practices must be supportive of software reuse for it to be a success. These 
policies and processes must be clearly defined and consistent with organizational culture 
and provide clear guidance on how it will be implemented and who is responsible, in 
much the same way as AC20-148 does. The policies, processes, and practices must 
incentivize software reuse, rewarding the practice and cementing it into the 
organizational culture. It is the policies, processes, and practices that will form an 
organization’s culture over time, and to succeed reuse must become part of that culture. A 
reusability culture will be created over time through organizational policies, processes, 
and practices. Meyer defines reusability culture as one in which all software is developed 
under the assumption that it will be reused.40 He also says that the reusability of any 
software should not be trusted until it has been reused. This essentially supports the 
treatment of reusability concerns throughout development and that just because software 
has been designed that way does not mean that it is reusable in another context without 
                                                 
39 R. Anthony., Software Firms Reap Benefits Of Code Reuse. The Wall Street Journal, December 3, 
2007.  www.livemint.com, http://www.livemint.com/2007/12/03233411/Software-firms-reap-benefits-
o.html 
40 M. Meyer., Object-Oriented Software Construction, Second Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: 
Prentice Hall PTR, 1997, p. 929. 
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sufficient evidence. This philosophy was also evident in the FAA AC20-148 Reusable 
Software Components guidance and by this framework.  
Reuse involves taking advantage of previous successes and in order to continue, 
policies must support it and not overly reward the use of newly created software. If 
people are paid more to create their own software rather than reuse existing software and 
past successes, the outcome will be predictable. This suggests that an organization should 
have policies and processes that enable a learning organization and have supportive 
metrics and compensation policies for reuse. The organization with a reuse strategy and 
goal must utilize metrics that assess the progress towards that goal. These metrics, based 
on data and information gained from the reuse of software and on the impact of software 
reuse, should inform policy decisions, therefore providing feedback and an improvement 
mechanism for the organization. Aligning compensation to reuse or creating a learning 
organization, one that learns from its successes, means that delivering repeatable results 
are viewed more highly than one off results. Repeatable results built on the foundations 
laid by others should be viewed as more valuable than any single results alone.  
These reuse processes and practices must be integrated into the existing software 
development process. For software reuse to permeate the system of systems, partnerships 
between stakeholders that will be promoted in policy and fostered by people are essential. 
These partnerships will be both intra- and inter-organization for software reuse to be a 
success. An example policy that will create and foster partnerships is a communication 
plan between the member organizations of the system of systems which will define the 
different types of communication, what they will be used to convey, and who is 
responsible for each. 
Other interesting business practices where reuse is encouraged include software 
development companies offering discounts for the retention of intellectual property (IP) 
rights for the software developed for clients so that they can reuse it on their future 
projects without requiring completely new developments or violating IP rights. This 
encourages the company to reuse and to capture some of the original development cost of 
the software on future projects. It encourages software developers to design for reuse and 
to consider other potential users of the same software.  
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On the other hand, reuse is enabled through transparency and the delivery of 
required IP rights to the customer. An example of this is the U.S. Navy’s open 
architecture (OA) strategy,41 a multi-faceted strategy providing a framework for 
developing joint interoperable systems that adapt and exploit open-system design 
principles and architectures. This framework includes a set of principles, processes, and 
best practices that, among other things, achieves component software reuse. By requiring 
open architectures and hence transparency of components, they are more readily reused 
by the Department of Defense (DoD) and those who the DoD wishes to contract with. 
However, in order to achieve this, the USN will likely have to pay a premium for that 
transparency and quality of the software upfront and hence commit to reuse to avoid 
excessive costs overall on its programs. The Navy requires that on each project it obtains 
and retains flexible IP rights and the IP rights it agrees to be based on the rights being 
offered, the rights the Government wants or needs, and the potential reuse for that 
software. The IP rights obtained and retained should be dependent on where the reuse is 
to occur and who is likely to reuse the software. Open IP rights facilitates reuse as 
interfaces can easily be determined; however, IP rights can be limited but promote reuse 
as long as interfaces are known and the organization responsible for the component 
development is involved in the reuse effort.   
The level of IP rights obtained and policy adopted in the acquisition of software 
will depend on the type of acquisition.  In between these two approaches may lie a way to 
achieve a sufficiently open architecture while minimizing costs and allowing the software 
developer to keep the IP for subsequent reuse both within DoD and externally. It may be 
the case that subsequent reuse by a DoD software supplier is subject to government 
approval. Another approach maybe that the government could initially own the IP but if a 
reuse opportunity is available, the company applies to the government for approval with 
some potential royalties and discounts on maintenance (evolution) as a result being 
passed back to the government. What is required is a way to effectively control the 
software, encourage reuse, and minimize overall cost so that access is available to the 
right information when it is required.    
                                                 
41 Naval Open Architecture, October 2007, https://acc.dau.mil/oa. 
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The FAA’s Reusable Software Components advisory circular AC20-148 provides 
a process for the regulator to review all relevant information for safety, regardless of 
whether the customer has all the information.42  Maybe the DoD airworthiness regulators 
could implement a similar approach where they have access to all IP but the respective 
user does not necessarily, thus removing the requirement for the user to pay for it in order 
to ensure that it can be reused safely. This may, however, create a conflict of interest as 
the airworthiness regulator is often not independent from the end user of the software 
component.  
Software for safety-critical system of systems should be developed with an 
assumption that it will be reused; however, it will not be blindly reused without 
considering its new context and performing a sufficient safety analysis. Policies and 
processes must be established that encourage and support reuse so that it is performed 
safely. Certain policies and approaches may be taken depending on who is reusing the 
software and for what purpose.  
A DoD policy for software reuse in safety-critical system of systems is required 
similar to the FAA AC20-148 that encourages reuse in the right circumstances and 
provides guidance on how it is to be performed, leveraging previous successful software 
in new systems development. The elements of that policy should come from this 
framework providing guidance on how software reuse will occur and how credit can be 
gained to make future software and system development more effective and efficient.   
8. Reuse Metrics 
Frakes and Terry established many useful reuse metrics in 1996,43 and only minor 
refinements have been made since then. The categorization of reuse metrics and models 
included cost-benefit analysis, maturity assessment, amount of reuse, failure mode 
                                                 
42 Advisory Circular AC 20-148, Reusable Software Components, US Department of Transportation, 
Federal Aviation Administration, December 7, 2004. 
43 W. Frakes., C. Terry., Software Reuse: Metrics and Models. ACM Computing Surveys, 28(2), June 
1996, p. 415-435. 
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analysis, reuse assessment and reuse library metrics. Lim44 developed a framework for 
reuse metrics based on the same Goal-Question-Metric paradigm described earlier to 
divide reuse metrics into the following six types: Economic Metrics, Primary Metrics, 
Library Metrics, Process Metrics, Product Metrics, and Asset Metrics. The exact choice 
of metrics from those listed above will be based on the organization’s particular situation 
and the questions it requires answers to, and their priorities. Ideally for reuse to be 
successful, it must be economical and lend itself to cost-benefit analysis and all other 
metrics will be subordinate. 
9. Conclusion      
  Organizational factors affect the success of any reuse effort. Without 
organizational factors that support reuse and their integration into the software 
development process, the result of any reuse initiative is likely to fail. For reuse to be 
successful, and in particular in safety-critical system of systems, these organizational 
factors need to be aligned such that they support systematic and careful reuse. Focusing 
on the technical aspects of reuse and failing to address the non-technical or organizational 
aspects will condemn any large scale systematic reuse effort to failure. Policies should 
cover the conduct of software reuse and maximize the utility of software reuse in a 
systematic way.   
C. REUSABLE SOFTWARE COMPONENT ATTRIBUTES 
1. Overview 
In consideration of those attributes the reusable software should possess, the 
software component is used, as it represents a common focus of reuse and a sufficiently 
sized entity to leverage the benefits of reuse.    
                                                 
44 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 
Organization for Reusable Components, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998, p. 301. 
 35
2. Definition of Software Component 
A software component is a collection of software comprising a module with a 
well defined purpose that may be used with no or minimal alteration. A component is 
thus a bounded element in a design and can be a single unit within that design. A 
component includes both tangible (code, design, test plans, and documentation) and 
intangible (e.g. knowledge and methodologies) elements. Ideally, a software component 
represents a reusable piece of software that can be easily integrated with other 
components with relatively little effort. The key is to achieve that ideal level. 
3. Component Attributes 
The software component attributes described in this section represent the ideals or 
goals as it may not be possible to achieve all in the one component. The following 
component attributes may not be achievable to the desired level and the exact levels will 
depend on the results of trade studies. It is important that these attributes be identified 
early so that they can be included in the trade studies and given due consideration. 
Consideration of those desired attributes and incorporation of them into the development 
process represents a design-for-reuse approach. As mentioned earlier there are no 
standards for development of safety-critical software that maximizes the utility of 
software reuse.45 This is also true in the safety-critical system of systems context. There 
is, however, some guidance on the certification requirements when an already certified 
software component is to be reused,46 but this does not focus on the design for reuse or 
those inherent attributes that the software component must exhibit in order to support 
effective reuse.  Thus, the focus here is on the attributes of reusable software components 
for use in safety-critical system of systems. That is, what attributes should be present to 
make component reuse easier or increase reusability of software in safety-critical system  
 
                                                 
45 J. Wlad., Software Reuse in Safety critical Airborne Systems, in Proc of 25th Digital Avionics 
Systems Conference, Oct 15, 2006, p. 6C5-1. 
46 Advisory Circular AC 20-148, Reusable Software Components, US Department of Transportation, 
Federal Aviation Administration, December 7, 2004. 
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of systems. It is important that components be designed for reuse, in that they exhibit 
these attributes as they will become members of the repository of reusable software 
components.   
Reusable software components for use in safety-critical system of systems should 
have the following attributes: 
• They should be transparent to the user or reuser, exhibiting an open 
architecture by default, including the essential documentation requirements of that 
component (see §3D for details on how that transparency should be defined).  
• The component should do one thing and do it well and have minimal 
interactions with other components. That is, the component should be highly cohesive 
with low coupling. Modular design should be adopted where functionality is partitioned 
into discrete, cohesive, and self-contained elements with well defined interfaces. This 
may be difficult to achieve in large component compositional reuse; however, this is a 
goal and modularity in design should be adhered to within the design of components.     
• The software component shall consist of well formed modules, be 
protected, include the localization of data, and comply with the criteria and principles for 
modularity. Meyer’s criteria for modularity—decomposability, composability, 
understandability, continuity and protection—and his five principles—direct mapping 
(Linguistic Modular Units), few interfaces, small interfaces (weak coupling and limited 
information exchange), explicit interfaces, and information hiding (providing uniform 
access)—should be followed in the design of reusable software components.47  
Decomposability is satisfied if it is possible to decompose the software into a 
smaller number of less complex problems. This is synonymous with the “divide-and-
conquer” approach to problem solving and the fact that it is often easier to construct a 
complex solution from the composition of a number of less complex solutions. The less 
complex problems should be connected via a simple structure with independence to 
facilitate further work proceeding separately on each one. If a component is 
                                                 
47 M. Meyer., Object-Oriented Software Construction, Second Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: 
Prentice Hall PTR, 1997, § 3.1,3.2. 
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decomposable it will be easier to evolve because changes can be focused on the 
respective module. Composability means that it is possible to remove the software 
element from the environment of its original design and use it in another environment. 
Understandability means that the software must contain sufficient information so that it 
can be understood. This is also relevant for the evolution process, as in order to adapt and 
modify the software component it is essential that it be understandable. This is the key to 
component specification, which will be discussed in the next section. Continuity means 
that a requirements or specification change will only result in change of just one module 
or a small number of modules. Protection means that potential abnormal condition will 
be contained within a module or, at worst, will only propagate to a few neighboring 
modules.  
Direct Mapping (Linguistic Modular Units) means that there should be structural 
correspondence (direct mapping) between the solution domain and the problem domain, 
as described by the model. In other words, a module should ideally perform a function or 
implement a feature from the problem domain description. The reusable software 
component should have as few interfaces and inter-communication as possible. The more 
relations and interfaces between modules, the more likely it is for the effect of a change 
or error to propagate to other modules. Those interfaces that do exist should be small and 
communicate as little information as possible (this is analogous to communication with 
limited bandwidth). Those interfaces that exist must be explicit and obvious from the 
information contained in each module. This interface information should be made explicit 
in the component specification. Information hiding or uniform access principle means 
that the implementation details of the services offered by a module should not be revealed 
but access to those services made available through a uniform notation.  
• A reusable software component should follow the “open-closed” principle 
in that it will be usable as it stands (closed) while still being adaptable (open).  
• The software components should be generic to allow for type variation 
and thus creating a wider range of reuse. It should be independent of implementation. 
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• The software component should include routine grouping in order to be 
self sufficient and cover all possible actions required for a particular purpose (i.e., include 
the complete set of routines required to achieve its intended purpose). 
• The software component should cover a wide variety of implementations 
through a module family where it is not possible for a single module to satisfy all 
requirements, thus requiring a module / component family.  
• The software component should be independent of representation; that is, 
the module should be able to carry out an operation without knowing implementation 
details and variants. 
• The software component should factor out common behaviors. Instead of 
having a component for every type of implementation such as in a family of components, 
common behaviors can be factored out and modularized into a component reducing the 
number of components or modules in a family. This makes the reuse decision easier than 
having a different component for each type of implementation. This is a principle of 
modular design and is extended further by Aspect-oriented Programming (AOP) with its 
focus on separation of concerns.       
• The component shall be robust in its environment. That is, it should react 
appropriately to a wide range of abnormal conditions when operating in the context of a 
system of systems. These reactions should be transparent as described above. Moreover, 
it should be complete, as opposed to efficient, and able to handle the conditions expected 
in the operating environment (safety-critical system of systems) with consideration given 
to unexpected but possible events. In an environment that is not safety-critical, it may be 
enough for the component to perform the desired function, and not be highly dependable. 
However, in safety-critical systems it is essential that the component is dependable, or in 
other words, from a safety perspective, failures will not produce hazardous conditions. In 
safety-critical system of systems the component must be complete and be adequately 
dependable (i.e., comply with the dependability requirements of the software system, 
derived from the system dependability requirements). Dependability is defined as: 
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The trustworthiness of a computing system which allows reliance to be 
justifiably placed on the service it delivers.48 
Dependability consists of the attributes of reliability, availability, safety, and 
security. These complete components should include error handling, be fault tolerant, and 
satisfy the safety attributes of the dependability requirements of the software system. 
Measuring the degree to which a software component is complete for its intended 
operating environment is a difficult endeavor, especially given the size of the input and 
hazard space. To be complete with respect to requirements is different then being 
complete with respect to the environment. Only when the set of software component 
requirements is the same as the requirements for the context of intended use can 
completeness be truly measured, and it is very difficult to determine whether these sets 
are the same. The application of an effective requirements elicitation technique that 
captures context of use requirements including safety requirements can assist in ensuring 
that these sets are as identical as possible. Metrics can provide an indication of 
completeness, assuming that the requirements set, including safety requirements, is 
complete for the intended environment. These metrics will be described and discussed in 
§3F.    
• The software component should be free of default behavior that the 
software engineer has not specifically described for that component. 
• The component should be sufficiently evaluated and tested to verify the 
implementation of the safety attributes and requirements. Producer testing has been 
identified as one of the critical success factors for reuse.49 Testing is essential in 
producing high quality software and for actually creating confidence in the claimed 
quality (the safety case will contain a significant contribution from testing). Even when 
one designs for quality and a certain safety attribute, it is still difficult to confirm or 
establish a case for that quality and attribute without testing. Testing must be performed 
to a level that builds the required safety case and meets the safety risk. Software systems 
                                                 
48 Dependability.org, IFIP WG-10.4, November 2006, http://www.dependability.org. 
49 W.C. Lim., Managing Software Reuse, A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering the 
Organization for Reusable Components, Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998, p. 79. 
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safety testing must show the correct implementation of safety design requirements, verify 
safe implementation of safety-critical functions, and provide a basis for qualitative risk 
reduction in hazard analyses.50    
• The software components must be designed with safety in mind, 
consisting of safety features and protection mechanisms, and should use formal semantics 
for specifying safety attributes and safety contracts. This could be performed by using a 
formal specification language to specify safety requirements and then designing to them.  
The use of formal methods is mandatory in the development of certain safety-critical 
software and their use here would be valuable in specifying the requirements in a precise, 
unambiguous form. For example, “The methods used in the SRS (safety-related software) 
development process shall include …: a) formal methods of software specification and 
design; …”51 
• The component should comply with the important critical success factors 
for reuse quality of the component. If a reused component is not of sufficient quality, the 
success of any future reuse will be jeopardized. This comes back to the requirement that a 
reusable component should be of high quality and highly dependable and that quality or 
dependability be explicitly defined in terms of specific quality attributes (sometimes 
referred to as “-ilities”) that the specific safety-critical context will determine. It is 
important to determine those attributes and define them in a meaningful and deliverable 
way. Applicable standards may be used to support the achievement of the requisite 
component quality; however, it is important to realize that using standards will not 
guarantee the required quality. Moreover, not using appropriate standards or processes 
will almost ensure that the desired quality is not present.   
Safety contracts may be used to design components to be reused in safety-critical 
software. However, the application of these safety contracts is yet to be demonstrated. 
Furthermore, adequate tool support does not exist to ensure that these safety contracts are 
binding throughout the development process. 
                                                 
50 SW4582 Weapon System Software Safety Lecture Notes, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 
51 UK Ministry of Defence, Defence Standard 00-55, Requirements for Safety Related Software in 
Defence Equipment, 1 Aug 97.   
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D. REUSABLE SOFTWARE COMPONENT SPECIFICATION 
1. Overview 
It is not enough to design a component for reuse and believe that it will subsequently 
be reused just because it exists and possesses the required attributes. Reuse must be enabled 
through appropriate specification of the component, providing the ability for a potential 
reuser to perform a specification match against the new requirements.    
The goal of reusable software component specification should be to reveal the 
essential information about the component to allow an effective reuse decision to be made 
while concealing the nonessential. This is just like any other area in software engineering 
where the key is to find the right level of abstraction for the message you are trying to 
communicate. In defining what is required in the specification it is important to think of the 
user of the reusable software component and determine what information is required to make 
that reuse decision. Furthermore, the potential user of the software component must be able 
to locate a candidate component. The question to be answered is: “Does the software 
component meet my requirements and what are the risks?”  In safety-critical system of 
systems the answer will not be simple and will involve the composition of many different 
types of information on the component. What will be required is the ability first to identify 
potential reuse candidates based on how close the specification meets the requirements and 
then to confirm the requirements match through further analysis.     
2. Software Component Specification 
There are many ways to specify a software component and completely describe it 
to provide the desired level of understandability. The level of understandability for 
safety-critical system of systems components is relatively high. Early work on specifying 
software components included the 3C model by Weide et al.52 and Tracz,53 which was a 
highly abstract framework model: 
                                                 
52 B.W. Weide., et al. (1991) Reusable software components, Advances in Computers, Yovits, M. C 
(ed.), Vol. 33, Academic Press. 
53 W. Tracz., The 3 Cons of Software Reuse, in Proc of the Third Annual Workshop on Software 
Reuse, July, Syracuse, NY, 1990. 
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Concept. A statement of what a piece of software does, factoring out how 
it does it (abstract specification of abstract behavior). 
Content. A statement of how a piece of software achieves the behavior 
defined in its concept (the code to implement a functional specification). 
Context. Aspects of the software environment relevant to the definition of 
concept or content that are explicitly part of the concept or content.  
Under that model, it could be still quite difficult for a user to find the component 
sought. Another model has been suggested to describe the software component and 
increase the transparency of the information of a particular software component through 
an extension of the Class Responsibility Collaboration (CRC) cards used in object-
oriented design. This model, proposed by Riehle,54 also at a high level of abstraction, can 
be used to describe the component providing more relevant information for matching 
than the earlier models of Weide and Tracz.  
The CRCCC or CRC3 specification as described by Riehle55 at the component 
level is:  
• Component Identifier. Self-describing name.  
• Responsibility. What problem are we trying to solve?  
• Collaborations. Identify other components. 
• Constraints and Bounds. Design metrics for each element. 
• Controls. Prevent internal and external variations, behaving like a 
feedback control loop with a (possibly varying) set-point. This also 
involves a clear statement of the action to be taken when a control 
is violated.  
                                                 
54 R. Riehle., Software Design Metrics: Designing Software Components to Tolerances, ACM 
SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, Volume 32, Issue 4, Article 7, July, 2007, p. 1-6. 
55 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Extending on the specification models described above we propose a new 
specification model to provide the necessary information for specification matching in 
safety-critical system of systems. That model, the C5RA model, is described as follows: 
• Component Identifier. This is the name of the component, which should 
be semantically accurate and conform to an agreed ontology convention. 
• Collaborations. This specifies any other components it requires to 
collaborate with to solve the problem utilizing the same ontology for the component 
identifier (as per section 3C, the design goal is to keep collaborations to a minimum). 
Furthermore, it is to include interface specifications for those collaborations.  
• Constraints and Limitations. The constraints and limitations are 
expressed in terms of design metrics for each element, including those related to safety, 
quality attributes, pre and post conditions, and invariants. 
• Controls. The controls for the software component should describe the 
failure conditions, safety features, protection mechanisms, and any potential safety 
concerns, as well as the mitigation strategy. The controls are the means for preventing 
failure and for mitigating the hazard causal factors.   
• Configurations. This is a description of the set of possible internal 
software configurations for the component.  
• Responsibility. This is a description of what problem the software 
component will solve and will typically be expressed in functional terms. 
• Analysis. This is the analysis of all safety concerns for the component, 
including interface safety concerns. It also consists of those open problem or safety 
reports, any assumptions made in the design of the component, and any supporting data 
or relevant information that supports the safety case or possible certification.   
This model has a different definition of control to the Riehle model.  
This specification model is required in addition to the set of software artifacts that 
comprise the software component in order to provide a complete specification of the 
known information on the software component. The set of software artifacts would be 
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provided separately to support further analysis and integration of the component into the 
system and system of systems post selection. This organizes the information on a 
software component in a suitable form to enable specification matching. The C5RA 
specification model partitions the relevant information into separate descriptive 
categories that can enable the initial search and, along with the information contained in 
each of the software component artifacts, represents a complete collection of the 
information for a component. It is important that each descriptive category provides 
sufficient detail to achieve the initial match and that software component information is 
available to conduct further analysis in order to downselect on the most appropriate 
component. This makes it easier to identify for reuse with a more complete understanding 
of what it will do.  
To complete the C5RA specification of a software component, an accompanying 
ontology is required so that proper classification occurs including naming conventions 
and relationships between entities (composition and decomposition relationships), which 
will reduce duplication and aid in searching (specification matching). The ontology will 
be organizational and domain specific and should be contained in policy and managed by 
the reuse librarian as well as the managers of those areas within the organization 
developing reusable software components. A standard ontology among an industry would 
enhance the ease of specification matching to requirements and facilitate more effective 
reuse. This would require commitment from industry or system of systems regulators and 
mandate that component specifications follow the C5RA format and a descriptive 
ontology. For example, the FAA in AC20-148 requires a number of deliverables, as 
described in DO-178B, to be submitted and could request that information is provided in 
accordance with the C5RA format using a standardized ontology to provide a high level 
abstraction to aid their analysis. This could also be utilized by other regulators such as the 
Naval Air Systems Command for USN and USMC aviation and the ADF for military 
aviation in Australia. For example, within the aviation industry, operating safety-critical 
system of systems the high level choices in the ontology for potential component 
identifiers within avionics software components may be: aircraft management, mission 
computing, navigation, collision avoidance, radar, sensor systems, data links, diagnostics, 
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weapon management, and weapons. The collaborations section of the C5RA specification 
may also use the same ontology when referring to the components it collaborates with to 
solve the problem as well as the type of collaborations.    
The component shall be specified in a language and description model (such as 
UML) that is in demand, standardized, and widely understandable. This is significant in 
this application domain as certain languages are better suited to conveying information 
about safety than others but it will be dependent on the specific domain of the system of 
systems and what the industry standard specification language may be, including formal 
specification languages.  
Complete documentation of the software including the C5RA is important to 
ensure transparency, understanding, and to support an effective reuse decision in safety-
critical system of systems. This is required of all reusable software components as the 
code itself only contains approximately 10% of the information on the software.56 The 
C5RA abstract model will not contain all relevant information for all potential contexts of 
use but it represents a sound approach to capturing that information that is known in the 
current context and providing it for potential users of the reusable component. Potential 
future users may require more information, depending on the exact context of use. Major 
design decisions should be recorded in their respective artifacts with a complete 
description of the rationale. The metrics should be for software quality and efficiency and 
be specific to the component’s functionality or potential use. It is therefore essential that 
for reusable software components to be used in safety-critical systems, software quality 
metrics be documented (third C in C5RA specification). Metrics providing indicators of 
quality attributes would be applicable to the reusable components. Software quality 
metrics are essential for reusable software components with potential use in safety-
critical systems.  
All information about the component should be part of the component itself. 
Some languages support automatic documentation, increasing the reusability of the 
software (e.g., RDoc in Ruby).  The documentation on the reusable software component 
                                                 
56 M. Auguston., SW4540 Software Testing Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, March 
26, 2007. 
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should also contain information on certifications achieved (e.g., FAA certifications for 
airborne software components, especially what level of certification has been achieved 
for the particular registered reusable software component) and any open problem reports. 
It is particularly relevant to record whether in the case of civil aviation, the FAA has 
accepted a software component as an RSC (Reusable Software Component). This 
acceptance information will provide potential users of the software component with 
information of its certification baseline and what may be required for their particular 
context of use.  
The C5RA model represents an effective component specification scheme at a 
high level of abstraction; however, all information of the software component should be 
available and contained with the product itself. C5RA represents a good starting point 
that, when accompanied by an ontology and division of component information within, 
can aid in locating candidate components for reuse and thus finding a specification match 
for the requirements.  
E. SAFETY PROCESS AND HAZARD ANALYSIS 
1. Overview 
A component that has been designed for reuse, meeting the attributes of reusable 
software components, and is specified appropriately (making it easy to identify and 
locate; and hence perform specification matching) does not automatically make it suitable 
for use in safety-critical system of systems. Safety-critical system of systems are so 
complex57 that each software component must be assessed for suitability in the context of 
use through a hazard analysis or, in this specific case, a system-of-systems hazard 
analysis. This is further reinforced in the FAA’s air circular guidance (AC20-148) on 
reusable software components (RSC) where for acceptance as an RSC and each 
subsequent reuse requires that there be no safety and other concerns before approval, 
although it is not specified how this will be done.  
                                                 
57 The reasons for this complexity are largely as a result of their not being one controlling entity over 
all within, the fact that the systems were not usually designed to operate in a system of systems and that 
there are many possible configurations and interfaces between concomitant systems. 
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Having quality well specified software components does not guarantee safe 
operation in an environment and state space that is significantly large and contains 
additional hazards to those represented by the sum of all concomitant system hazards in 
the system of systems. These additional hazards are called emergent hazards and need to 
be identified, analyzed, and treated along with revisiting and analyzing those existing 
system hazards. An emergent hazard is a hazard that may occur within a system of 
systems that is not attributable to a single system.  
A system-of-systems hazard is any hazard that may occur within a system of 
systems. The system-of-systems hazards or hazard space consists of those hazards 
attributable to the individual systems of the system of systems and emergent hazards. A 
system-of-systems hazard analysis is essential before an effective reuse decision is made 
on a software component for use in a safety-critical system-of-systems. This is required 
once a specification match is achieved and the software component incorporated into a 
system. When a software component is considered for reuse in this environment, the 
system-of-systems hazard analysis must be updated including the analysis of the system 
hazards as well as any potential emergent hazards that could arise through the use of the 
system containing the reused software component. The reassessment of system hazards as 
a result of the new component is defined and documented in MIL-STD-882D and the 
system safety handbook;58 however, the emergent hazard analysis process is relatively 
immature. The identification of system-of-systems hazards involves a collaborative effort 
on behalf of all program members and stakeholders in the system of systems, just as it 
does in the identification of system hazards; however, in this new context that 
collaboration requires effective management to ensure a comprehensive set of hazards is 
identified and effectively treated.  A system-of-systems hazard ontology is required to 
assist in considering all potential hazard types, providing consistency and for providing a 
starting point for the emergent hazard analysis part of the system-of-systems hazard 
analysis. A detailed ontology will provide an abstract description of the hazard type and 
                                                 
58 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. System Safety Handbook (DHB-S-001). Dryden 
Research Flight Center, Edwards, CA, 1999.   
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assist in ensuring that all potential hazard types are investigated and analyzed to the 
extent possible given project constraints and the system of systems safety requirements.     
When a decision is made to reuse software in safety-critical system of systems the 
system-of-systems hazard analysis needs to be updated. It is possible to identify system 
hazards as a result of the reuse in the system(s) containing the reused software following 
the process defined in MIL-STD-882D or adapting the AS/NZS 4360 risk management 
standard; however, not all hazards will be considered using that process alone. The 
system hazards in the new context following reuse will likely involve those from the 
previous system hazard analysis and will provide a good starting point for the new hazard 
analysis. The goal in the case of reusing software is to update the system-of-system 
hazard analysis by updating the system hazard analysis and the emergent hazard analysis. 
That update may include new system hazards and emergent hazards that must be 
identified in the first instance. 
The system safety process and the risk management process are very similar, both 
starting with the identification of their respective elements followed by analysis and a 
way of treating those elements. The risk management process identified in AS/NZS 4360 
is more iterative, involving the monitoring, reviewing, communicating and consulting of 
risk information throughout the process than that defined in MIL-STD-882D. It is the 
identification part in the process that is the most difficult because it is often not easy to 
identify all risks, hazards, or potential risks and hazards. If the risks or hazards are not 
identified, then there is nothing that can intentionally or consciously be done to treat 
them. Furthermore, it is often the identification part of the process that is the entry point 
for risks or hazards and if missed here, they will not be considered. This is further 
exacerbated in a system-of-systems context because there are emergent hazards that 
cannot be attributed to any one system in isolation. Therefore, a technique that just sums 
those system hazards within the safety-critical system of systems will omit an important 
and significant category of hazards. Ways to overcome the identification problem are to: 
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• Use a well developed ontology of hazards or hazard categories and apply a hazard 
analysis process to each category. This will serve to identify the high level 
abstract hazards that could possibly exist and allow for exploration in more detail 
in each category, through hazard decomposition, considering the impact of the 
addition of the new component.  
• Brainstorm or use the collaboration of all stakeholders as a potential source of 
hazard information and empower them to identify hazards in their own area for 
consideration by the system safety team.  
• Utilize safety experts. This is required in most system safety efforts. System 
safety experts or team members are essential members of the development and 
operational team through the input of safety information into the process; 
however, they do not provide a systematic way of identifying all hazards. 
Furthermore, they do not necessarily have expertise in areas where hazards may 
exist. They are not the panacea to the identification problem but serve as an 
essential member and part of the solution.  
It is the hazard identification problem that is the most important because once 
identified, hazards can be considered and tracked and the appropriate treatment provided 
in the right form at the right time. 
When a software component or artifact is to be reused, the system-of-systems 
hazard analysis should be revisited and updated to include the new component and its 
system. One should also revisit the emergent hazards analysis and consider the emergent 
hazard categories for new hazards.   
A candidate process for conducting system-of-systems hazard analyses that 
incorporates software reuse is: 
1. Establish the context or environment for the system of systems. 
2. Identify all systems in the system of systems. 
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3. Conduct the system safety process as defined in MIL-STD-882D or similar 
standard such as AS/NZS 4360 to identify, analyze, evaluate, and treat all 
system hazards including those of the system(s) containing the reused 
software.  
4. Define the system-of-systems architecture. 
5. Identify the emergent hazards of the system of systems using a suitable 
technique based on a ontology of hazards (such as those partially identified by 
Redmond59 to include reconfiguration, integration, and interoperability 
hazards at a high level of abstraction) to assist in considering all the potential 
hazard types and their specifics based on the system-of-systems architecture. 
It is essential to utilize stakeholder collaboration and safety experts as part of 
this process.  
6. Analyze emergent hazards. 
7. Evaluate the mishap risk. 
8. Treat the mishap risks.  
9. Evaluate the residual mishap risk (and compare with the acceptable risk). 
The process involves continual feedback, review, monitoring, communication and 
consultation of hazard and risk information and continues until the mishap risk reaches an 
acceptable value determined by the appropriate governing body (or regulator) of the 
system of systems. Furthermore, the process is iterative in nature and not entirely 
sequential. Step 3, the system safety process, should be performed in parallel with steps 
4, 5, and 6 with collaboration and communication between them to ensure sharing of 
relevant hazard information. This process involves the monitoring, reviewing, 
communicating, and consulting of risk information throughout the process as per the 
AS/NZS standard.  
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An important part of the information about any software component and program 
activity are the relevant metrics. This section introduces those metrics of interest when 
developing software for reuse in safety-critical system of systems and those metrics 
relevant to measuring the success of a reuse program. In the C5RA specification model, 
these metrics should be made available to enable future reuse (as well as evolution) and 
should be specified within the Constraints and Limitations element of the model.     
2. Software Safety Metrics 
To minimize risk (safety or otherwise) and increase the chance of a successful 
outcome, quantitative support for management decision making is required; that is 
provided through effective metrics. Metrics are an extension of measurements when 
provided within context, enabling greater interpretation and understanding of what is 
occurring. They are indicators that provide the impetus for control of what is of value. 
Software safety cannot be proven or predicted due to environmental uncertainty 
and because exhaustive testing is infeasible. Even if all potential hazards are identified, 
one can only demonstrate that you have not found the software exhibiting any behavior 
that could result in a hazard, not that the software is free from conditions that will result 
in a hazard. Formal methods, which are the software development activities that employ 
mathematically based techniques for describing, reasoning about, and realizing system 
properties, expressed using formal languages60 will not reveal the absence of a safety 
requirement. Software safety metrics will not tell us whether the system is safe, but they 
can provide indicators of potential safety problems and risks. Software safety risk metrics 
are intended to support detection and analysis of software-related safety issues in a timely 
manner and make potential risks visible. Furthermore, they can be used in developing the 
                                                 
60 D. Drsinsky., J.B. Michael., M. Shing., The Three Dimensions of Formal Validation and 
Verification of Reactive System Behaviors, Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report NPS-CS-07-008, 
Monterey, CA, August 2007.   
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safety case for the software and in providing quantitative evidence to regulatory 
authorities. The organizational use of metrics can be characterized by the CMMI process 
maturity level of that organization. 
Most of the work in deriving software safety metrics is based on the Goal, 
Question, Metric (GQM) methodology developed by Basili and Weiss, which uses a 
general process to determine effective metrics. That general process involves: 
1. Identification of information needs. 
2. Interpretation of an information need as being within an information 
category. 
3. Identification of measurable concepts within each information category. 
4. Identification of prospective measures, associated with each measurable 
concept. 61 
This approach to determine effective metrics ensures the rationale behind the 
metric exists and that what is subsequently measured has value and forms an aid to 
effective decision making and control.  
Reliability, an important software quality metric and sub-element of 
dependability, can be used as an indirect indicator of safety, with caution. Although 
orthogonal dimensions of dependability, they are often erroneously equated. Reliability is 
defined as the probability that an item will perform a required function, under stated 
conditions, for a stated period of time.62 Safety is the probability that conditions that can 
lead to a mishap (hazards) do not occur, whether or not the intended function is 
performed. In general, reliability requirements are concerned with making a system 
failure free, whereas safety requirements are concerned with making it mishap free. 
These are not congruent goals and are therefore not synonymous. Reliability is concerned 
                                                 
61 V. Basili., D. Weiss., A Methodology For Collecting Valid Software Engineering Data,  IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, October 1984. 
62 D.J. Smith., Reliability Maintainability and Risk, practical Methods for Engineers, Seventh Edition. 
Oxford, England.: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005, p. 12. 
 53
with every possible software fault,63 whereas safety is only concerned with those faults 
that may result in actual system hazards. Not all software faults cause safety problems, 
and not all software that functions according to specification is safe. Severe mishaps have 
occurred while something was operating exactly as intended, that is without failure. 
Improving reliability will not necessarily improve safety. It will depend on where the 
reliability improvement is made. Improving reliability by removal of faults or preventing 
the propagation of faults may not remove or prevent propagation of those faults that lead 
to safety related failures and thus not improve safety at the same time. If, however, all 
safety requirements are in the software specification, then reliability can provide a more 
accurate predictor or indicator of safety. If reliability is improved in the area of safety-
critical software and all safety requirements are included, an increase in safety will result.  
Reliability of the software component and its system is important; however, it should be 
monitored and analyzed separately from safety, when ensuring system dependability 
requirements are achieved.   
The identification and implementation of safety requirements is a key function in 
system and software safety. All software safety requirements are to be met in the design 
and implementation of the software and must be verified: each safety requirement must 
have a test case or cases associated with them. For verification there needs to be a 
mapping between the safety requirements and test cases with this mapping reflected in 
the Software Safety Requirements Traceability Matrix.64 A potentially useful metric to 
determine whether verification activities have been identified for the safety requirements 
is the number of safety requirements unlinked to test cases (SRUTC).65 If this value does 
not tend to approach zero over time, then the safety risks are not being identified as 
requiring testing or verification.  
 
                                                 
63 Fault in this case refers to a defect within the system. 
64 J.B. Michael., SW4582 Weapon System Software Safety Lecture Notes, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2006. 
65 V. Basili., K. Dangle., L. Esker., F. Marotta., Gaining Early Insight into Software Safety: Measures 
of Potential Problems and Risks, in Proc of the Systems & Software Technology Conference, June 2007, p. 
22. 
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If f(x) is the Safety Requirements Unlinked to Test Cases (SRUTC) and x is time 
to release of the software, then: 
 lim     f(x) = 0 
x→0 
Equation 1:  Desired Value of SRUTC Over Time  
SRUTC is most useful during the requirements analysis and design phases where 
it is important that a means of verification has been established for each safety 
requirement. SRUTC can ensure that when a safety requirement is identified and 
analyzed, it is written in a manner that aids testing and plans for proof of it being met.  
Another similar metric that we propose that is available later in the system 
lifecycle is the safety requirements demonstration metric (SRDM),66 which is obtained 
by dividing the total number of separately identified safety requirements in the software 
requirements specification (SRS) that have been successfully demonstrated by the total 
number of separately identified safety requirements in the SRS. Ideally the SRDM should 
be equal to one, indicating that the implementation of each safety requirement has been 
tested.   
SRDM   =   Total Number of Demonstrated Safety Requirements          
Total Number of Safety Requirements 
Equation 2.  Software Requirements Demonstration Metric 
 
SRDM differs from SRUTC in that the former monitors the demonstration of the 
safety requirements whereas the latter ensures that the verification activity has been 
identified.  
To place the required emphasis and priority on safety, it is essential in the 
development of safety-critical software that an adequate proportion of the requirements 
set consists of safety requirements. Thus the question that could be asked here is: “Are 
there a reasonable number of software safety requirements being identified?” The metric 
                                                 
66 Adapted from the requirements demonstration metric in IEEE standard for Software Quality 
Assurance Plans, 730-1998, p. 3. 
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could be Percent Software Safety Requirements (PSSR),67 which is the percentage of 
software safety requirements relative to the total number of software requirements. If the 
number of identified software safety requirements is not “reasonable” relative to the 
platform family or in line with system safety in general, this would represent a risk. If 
there are too few software safety requirements, this would represent a safety risk and 
alternatively too many could result in cost and schedule risks for the project or 
development. The assessment of reasonableness would be based on heuristics derived 
from past experience in the development of safety-critical software and on engineering 
judgment of what would make a reasonable percentage given the potential hazards and 
risks. This metric has the most relevance during requirements and analysis activities of 
the software life cycle, where an early indication of whether safety is being adequately 
considered in the development is available.   
PSSR =  Number of Software Safety Requirements 
        Number of Software Requirements  
Equation 3.   Percent Software Safety Requirements 
 
Other safety metrics of value are related to hazard identification and provides 
answers to the following questions: 
 
• Have a reasonable number of software safety hazards been identified? 
 
• Are causes, controls and verifications being generated over time? 
 
• Does every cause have at least one control? 
 
• Does every control have at least one verification to test that the control has 
been implemented? 
The subsequent metrics68 are: 
 
                                                 
67 V. Basili., K. Dangle., L. Esker., F. Marotta., Gaining Early Insight into Software Safety: Measures 
of Potential Problems and Risks, in Proc of the Systems & Software Technology Conference, June 2007, p. 
17. 
68 V. Basili., K. Dangle., L. Esker., F. Marotta., Gaining Early Insight into Software Safety: Measures 
of Potential Problems and Risks, in Proc of the Systems & Software Technology Conference, June 2007, p. 
18. 
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• Percent Software Hazards (PSH), which is the number of software safety 
hazards divided by the number of system safety hazards. If number of identified hazards 
is not “reasonable” then there are problems with the hazard management and analysis 
process for software.  
PSH =      Number of Software Safety Hazards 
  Number of System Safety Hazards  
Equation 4.   Percent Software Hazards 
 
This metric, like the Percent Software Safety Requirements, will indicate whether 
software hazards are receiving the appropriate attention compared to all system safety 
hazards. This metric also has most relevance during requirements and analysis activities 
of the software life cycle to provide early consideration and indication of whether 
software safety hazards are being appropriately identified in order for them to be 
managed. This metric should also be updated throughout the software life cycle to keep 
the safety case current and to ensure software safety hazards are being appropriately 
considered when the system and software undergoes changes and evolution.  
• Controls with causes (CwC) is the number of software safety hazard causes for 
which there is a control divided by the number of causes for all software safety hazards. 
If there are causes without controls then there are problems with the hazard management 
process for software. This metric is most relevant during the analysis, design, and 
implementation phases, where software safety hazard controls are designed into the 
software component and system.   
CwC =        Number of Causes with a Control           
                      Total Number of Causes for all Hazards 
Equation 5.  Controls with Causes 
 
•  Verifications with controls (VwC) is the number of controls for which there is a 
verification divided by the number of controls for all hazard causes. If there are controls 
without verification, then there are problems with the hazard management and analysis 
process for software. 
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VwC =   Number of Controls for which there is a Verification 
                     Total Number of Controls for all Causes of Hazards 
Equation 6.  Verifications with Controls 
This metric follows on from CwC, where it is essential for software assurance that 
the hazard-cause control is associated with an appropriate verification. This metric is 
most relevant during the analysis, design, and implementation phases, where software 
safety hazard controls will be linked to verification activities. These verifications will 
subsequently guide testing of the software component to ensure that the controls 
implemented perform as intended and reduce the safety risk.  
Another metric identified by Basili et al. within hazard management that can be a 
useful indicator of safety answers the question: “Is the number of open software hazard 
components (causes, controls, and verifications) shrinking over time?” What is desirable 
is for the number of open software causes and controls to be closing over time to indicate 
that hazards are progressively being brought under acceptable control. This metric, called 
the Hazard Cause/Control Closure Evolution (HCCE),69 is a three point moving average 
of the set of open causes and controls at three consecutive time intervals. This metric 
indicates relative performance of closing hazard causes with controls and verification 
with respect to previous time periods (rather than just looking at the number of open 
causes in isolation). If greater than one, this would suggest that hazard causes or controls 
are opening faster than they are closing. What is important here is to understand the 
relationship between the metric and the stage in the lifecycle the software is in. Early on 
values greater than one are acceptable; however, at some point the value should remain 
below one. The value will also depend on the type of system developed and its 
environment, although at some stage it would be expected that hazard causes or controls 
will be opening faster than they are closing (early in software life cycle). A decline in this 
value over time will suggest that hazard causes and their controls are being brought under 
control and be representative of system maturity and context of use stability.   
                                                 
69 V. Basili., K. Dangle., L. Esker., F. Marotta., Gaining Early Insight into Software Safety: Measures 
of Potential Problems and Risks, in Proc of the Systems & Software Technology Conference, June 2007, p. 
19. 
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Another metric identified by Basili et al. determines whether the software being 
developed is receiving the appropriate level of rigor for its software risk. Level of rigor is 
defined as: 
The amount of requirements analysis, development discipline, testing, and 
configuration control required to mitigate the potential safety risks of the 
software component.70 
Example level of rigor metrics are Percent Requirements Level of Rigor 
(PRLOR) and Percent Code Level of Rigor (PCLOR),71 which compares whether the 
level of rigor employed is what is expected of software with a certain level of autonomy 
or control categorization. This is similar to ensuring that the software receives the 
appropriate level of analysis and testing for its control category according to the software 
hazard risk index within the software risk assessment matrix. An example software level 
of rigor and what is expected at each software level is contained in Appendix A. Another 
example of a similar approach is the software life cycle process objectives and outputs by 
software level provided in DO-178B Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification.72  It is important to have a metric that indicates whether the 
appropriate rigor or attention is given to the category of software. That metric can be 
expressed in percentage terms against what is expected. If these percentages are not 
within reasonable values, then safety-critical software might not be developed to the 
appropriate level nor receive the appropriate level of attention during development. 
Additionally, if the percentage is too high, this could increase the cost and schedule risk 
for the project. This type of metric is relevant throughout software development and can 
be used during all activities in the development of software for safety-critical systems. 
This metric also appears to be applying a CMMI type approach to the development of 
safety critical software and ensuring that certain activities occur depending on the level of 
software being developed. There is an underlying assumption in this metric that the 
                                                 
70 V. Basili., K. Dangle., L. Esker., F. Marotta., Gaining Early Insight into Software Safety: Measures 
of Potential Problems and Risks, in Proc of the Systems & Software Technology Conference, June 2007, p. 
33. 
71 Ibid., p. 21. 
72 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, DO-178B / ED-12B, Software Considerations in 
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, Washington D.C., 1 December 1992, Annex A. 
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development effort should depend on the level of criticality of the software. There should 
also be an industry wide accepted best practice for what that effort should be when 
developing safety-critical software. As described later in this section, the +SAFE73 
extension to the CMMI provides an example of this type of approach.      
It is also essential to determine whether software safety defects are being 
resolved. A relatively simple metric can be applied here for safety defects that is a 
measure of the number of safety defects and then a list of them in priority order. This will 
assist in the progress of resolving safety defects and provide an indicator of safety for the 
software. Furthermore, safety defect density can indicate how effectively the 
development designed software that was free of safety defects. This metric could also be 
used to compare projects and create a baseline for organizational process improvement in 
the removal of safety defects. This metric is applicable throughout verification and 
testing where the defects are identified and the test results used during both redesign and 
re-coding efforts.  
Another approach to minimizing risk including safety risk is the application of the 
SEI CMMI. The CMMI characterizes an organization based on the maturity of its 
processes on a scale of one to five, from initial (1) to optimized (5).  The premise 
underlying CMMI is that improved and mature processes result in higher quality and risk 
reduction. Contracting with an organization at a higher maturity level on the CMMI 
model reduces development risk and increases the chances of a successful outcome. The 
Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) in Australia, users of the CMMI  to improve its 
acquisition and maintenance of software-intensive systems, recognized that the model 
may inadequately address the specialized needs relating to safety-critical systems and so 
developed a safety extension in conjunction with the Software Verification Research 
Centre (SVRC) to the CMMI called “+SAFE”.74 The aim of this extension is to identify 
                                                 
73 Software Engineering Institute, Defence Materiel Organisation Australian Department of Defence. 
+SAFE, V1.2 A Safety Extension to CMMI-DEV, V1.2, Technical Note CMU/SEI-2007-TN-006, March 
2007. 
74 Software Engineering Institute, Defence Materiel Organisation Australian Department of Defence. 
+SAFE, V1.2 A Safety Extension to CMMI-DEV, V1.2, Technical Note CMU/SEI-2007-TN-006, March 
2007. 
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the safety strengths and weaknesses of product and service suppliers, and to address 
identified weaknesses early in the acquisition process.75 The safety extension was 
developed so that CMMI appraisers and users can become familiar with the structure, 
style, and content provided to reduce dependence on safety domain expertise.  
This extension to CMMI consists of two safety process areas added to CMMI-
DEV to provide an explicit and focused basis for appraising or improving an 
organization’s capabilities for providing safety-critical products. Those two safety 
process areas are Safety Management within the Project Management CMMI category 
and Safety Engineering within the Engineering CMMI category. It essentially provides a 
process for developing safety-critical products, and a metric or measurement would be 
how well does the organization’s process for developing safety-critical software follow 
that defined by the +SAFE extension. In other words, the metric would be representative 
of and answer the question of “how close to this benchmark is the organization?” The 
metric used is the integration of the percent satisfaction of the specific goals within each 
process area and CMMI category. The closer the organization is to the +SAFE process 
the greater the organization’s understanding of the safety domain and the increased 
likelihood that the organization will be able to deliver safe software. This information 
would not only be useful in the development of safety-critical software, but it also 
provides evidence for input to the safety case for the software (and the parent system) and 
assists in making assessments of an organization’s capability for developing safety-
critical software.          
The work of Jones proposes a key node safety metric and a safety improvement 
algorithm. The key node safety metric predicts the relative safety between different 
versions of software modules using a heuristic analysis of fault tree structure and 
calculates a value based on the fault tree properties such as key node height, size of key 
node sub-trees, and the number of key nodes. The safety improvement algorithm provides 
an objective method of improving a system’s safety by determining which components 
                                                 
75 M. Bofinger., N. Robinson., P. Lindsay., M. Spiers., M. Ashford., A. Pitman., A. Experience with 
Extending CMMISM for Safety Related Applications, in Proc of the 12th International Symposium of the 
International Council on Systems Engineering, (INCOSE'02), Las Vegas, Nevada, 2002, p1. 
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need improvement and by what amount in order to achieve the desired increase in safety. 
The algorithm also provides an estimate of resource requirements in man-hours to meet 
the safety requirement.  The key node safety metric has much promise and benefit as it is 
based on causal factors and the relationships between events that result in hazards. 
Moreover, as during hazard analysis, fault trees are prepared incorporating this metric 
would be easy as it could leverage off the existing fault trees and involve defining the 
properties of those already identified key nodes. This metric has potential value in 
enabling decisions on safety of designs, minimizing the potential for causal factors to 
propagate, and in building in fault tolerance. This metric requires testing on whether it  
benefits the design and safety assessment of a safety-critical software-intensive system. 
With this metric, a pilot project should be used to validate it and to test whether it 
effectively supports decision making. If this metric is validated, it could have a 
significant impact on the evolution and improvement of software components in safety-
critical system of systems.  
Test metrics are also relevant to software safety assessments. The test coverage 
and results will be a source of metrics information to determine the safety of the software. 
The relevant metrics include test case criteria, such as statement, decision, condition, and 
define-use pair and usage-based coverage. It would be preferable to conduct higher 
criteria testing on the safety-critical software and that software that has successfully 
passed those higher criteria testing can be inferred as being safer. The level of testing and 
its coverage will depend on the resources available and the requirements of any 
regulatory agency. The degree of test coverage of safety critical software should be 
adequately determined. If software testers are aware of the need for additional test 
coverage of safety critical functions, these will be incorporated into the routine testing 
which will then influence developers to design in safety as they will be aware of the 
increase in quality required of their software.  
Although the above software safety metrics appear to be effective in theory, they 
should be validated in a realistic environment. A number of the metrics also rely on 
subjective assessments, baselines, or heuristics to determine what is a reasonable value 
for the metric, so the application of these may take time and a number of developments to 
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achieve optimal outcomes (i.e., determination of what “reasonable” values are). These 
software safety metrics add value to the development and provide an important indicator 
of software safety and support management decisions. They are also important safety 
indicators for designing reusable software components for use in safety-critical system of 
systems. 
It is important not to act on metrics information alone, to understand that they are 
indicators of potential safety issues, and to use them as triggers for further analysis, 
which should be inherently available in the component. In the application of metrics it is 
important that the essential ones be implemented (those that provide the best indication of 
safety) and the collection methods resourced. It is essential to focus on the key indicators 
and not try to collect as much information as you can as this will only distill that 
information that is critical. This needs to also be balanced with the measurements already 
conducted so that the safety metrics collection process integrates seamlessly with other 
metrics processes.  
There are other metrics, such as those identified in IEEE Standard for Software 
Quality Assurance Plans, 730-1998 (branch metric, decision point metric, domain metric, 
error message metric) which provides minimum acceptable requirements for preparation 
and content of Software Quality Assurance Plans (SQAPs) applicable to the development 
and maintenance of critical software; however, they may relate more to the aggregation 
of quality attributes as opposed to the more safety focused metrics described here. 
Furthermore, this standard provides the minimum requirements for SQAPs and would 
thus be expected to be applied by most organizations developing and maintaining critical 
software. What is required are metrics that are more focused on safety and descriptive of 
the safety of the software. 
3. Summary of Software Safety Metrics 
Table 3 represents a summary of the software safety metrics identified herein, 
their relative ranking of importance (usefulness) in designing safe software and the part 
of the software lifecycle where they are most relevant. 
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The number of software safety 
requirements divided by the 
number of software requirements 
Reasonable Value 
based on heuristics 
and experience 
Requirements 
2 Percent Software 
Hazards (PSH) 
The number of software safety 
hazards divided by the number of 
system safety hazards 
Reasonable Value 
based on heuristics 
and experience 
Requirements 
3 SEI CMMI 
+SAFE Extension 
A process for developing safety 
critical products and a measure of 
how close to the standard a 
developer is  
100% meaning that 
the organization 
complies with all 





4 Percent Level of 
Rigor (or analysis 
and testing effort) 
Compares the level of rigor 
employed to what is expected of 
software with a certain level of 
autonomy or control 
categorization 




Unlinked to Test 
Cases (SRUTC) 
The number of safety 
requirements unlinked to test 
cases 





6 Open Software 
Safety Defects 
The number of open software 
safety defects with priority  
0 Design, 
Implementation, 
and Testing  
7 Controls with 
Causes (CwC) 
The number of causes with a 
control divided by the total 
number of causes for all hazards 
1 Design and 
Implementation 
8 Verifications with 
Controls (VwC) 
The number of controls for which 
there is a verification divided by 









Three point moving average of 
the set of open causes and 
controls at three consecutive time 
intervals 
1 or less. Greater 
than 1 means hazard 
causes or controls 
are opening faster 








The total number of demonstrated 
safety requirements divided by 
the total number of safety 
requirements 
Reasonable Value 
determined by past 
experience 
Testing 
11 Test Metrics Test case criteria such as 
statement, decision, condition and 
define-use pair and usage-based 
coverage and the results 
Type of test 
coverage and a 
successful test  
Testing 
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12 Key Node Safety 
Metric (S) 
A metric for predicting the 
relative safety between different 
versions of software modules 
using heuristic analysis of fault 
tree structure, based on fault tree 
properties such as key node 
height, size of key node sub-trees, 
and the number of key nodes 
0 to 1. The higher 
the value the better  
Design and 
Implementation 
Table 3.   Software Safety Metrics Ranking and Relevance  
G. REGULATOR NEEDS 
As explained in Chapter II, the regulator will have significant influence on the 
elements of the framework and what evidence is required for each. This will depend on 
the specific regulator, domain of operation, and the public interest as most regulators are 
independent public bodies established to protect the public interest and public safety. 
They will exert influence and help shape the specific requirements within each element of 
the framework as described in this chapter.  
H.  SUMMARY 
 The framework described herein prescribes that in order to successfully 
implement software reuse in safety-critical system of systems, organizational factors 
must be supportive, components must be designed for reuse, those components 
sufficiently specified, and an assessment on the environment suitability made before 
deployment. The metrics covered in this chapter support the safety aspects of the 
software and those that are related to measuring the success of the reuse itself. The 
regulator will be expected to further shape the requirements of each section of the 






IV. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
A. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
For the purpose of discussing how this framework may be applied, a generic 
avionics software component is chosen as the reusable software component and the 
safety-critical system of systems is the U.S. Naval aviation system of systems. It is 
assumed that there is a desire among stakeholders to reuse this avionics software in future 
aircraft systems or additional platforms within a system of systems (as evident in Navy’s 
open architecture strategy, which among other things seeks to enable component reuse). 
The system of systems includes the aircraft, air traffic control, communication systems, 
naval vessels and bases, and the ground- and air-based systems of all those elements 
interoperating with Naval aviation to achieve the common mission.  
1. Example Process Applying the Framework   
Although the framework for software reuse in safety-critical system of systems is 
process neutral, this example application of the framework will utilize a process for 
demonstration purposes only. The framework is applied throughout the software life 
cycle of the reusable software component and is shown in figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   Example Process Showing Application of the Framework 
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When developing this avionics software component and determining its 
acceptability for reuse in the environment, the following example approach may be 
applied: 
• Establish organizational factors that are supportive of reuse to ensure that 
incongruent organizational factors will not undermine a reuse approach. Create 
the appropriate organizational structure to manage the software component and 
a software repository staffed with the appropriate people to manage it.  Invest 
the necessary resources in the reuse effort to ensure that the software 
component is suitable for reuse with significant stakeholder support for the 
decision to design for reuse. Align organizational policies so that they 
incentivize reuse and ensure that it is managed effectively. 
• Design for reuse through the appropriate investments in quality and the 
utilization of the desirable software component attributes described in §3C3. 
Apply the software safety metrics described in §3F2 to indicate progress in 
designing in safety in their respective order of significance at the applicable 
stage throughout development to indicate progress or achievement in 
minimizing the mishap risk. The software safety metrics are applied to ensure 
that safety is considered throughout the software development process.   
• Specify and document the software component using the guidelines in §3D2. 
Ensure that all information on the component remains with the component 
including the C5RA software component specification model utilizing an 
appropriate stakeholder (including regulator) endorsed ontology and the 
respective software artifacts for the software component. The specification of 
the component must facilitate searching by a respective future user (i.e., 
specification matching). That is, a potential user must be able to decide 
whether the component meets their requirement and provide more detailed 
information once a decision has been made to investigate the component 
further. The C5RA model should be used as a high level abstract description of 
the component, coupled with an appropriate stakeholder-endorsed ontology to 
assist in providing the information required by future potential users and 
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maintainers of the software as it evolves. All software artifacts for the 
component should be properly documented in the respective accepted 
languages and models and provided with the C5RA model information.  
• The component should be placed in the software repository where that 
information can be easily accessed, supported by tools, and managed by the 
appropriate people in accordance with policy.   
• Software component information should be made available to the system of 
systems regulator, to provide early software component descriptions and 
information that is necessary for the regulator to be actively involved in the 
certification process. This information is to be provided to the regulator 
(certification authority) regardless of whether it has been provided to the 
applicant, integrator, or user in order to achieve certification for operation in 
the system of systems. The exact timings for provision of this information will 
be dependent on the particular regulator. 
• Perform a system-of-systems hazard analysis that incorporates the reusable 
software component. This system-of-systems hazard analysis will include the 
identification, analysis, and treatment of all system of system hazards (i.e., 
system hazards and emergent hazards). This analysis information will be used 
as input to the safety case and to update the Analysis element of the C5RA 
model which will subsequently be provided to the regulator as required. 
Evidence must be obtained and captured that is supportive of an acceptable 
level of safety risk (that is, the safety-critical system of systems to contain the 
component is considered “safe enough”76).  
• Deploy the software component in the system of systems if the system-of-
systems hazard analysis (environment match) is supportive of an acceptable 
level of safety or mishap risk and the regulator accepts. Operational 
                                                 
76 Safe enough may be defined as that point where the benefits of the system outweigh the risks to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis by the relevant system stakeholders.  
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information is used to constantly update to system-of-systems hazard analysis 
to ensure an acceptable level of safety / mishap risk.   
• Capture reuse metrics throughout the software life cycle and update the reuse 
cost-benefit analysis in order to measure the success of the reuse program. This 
will ensure that reuse performance is measured to enable leveraged success and 
to populate and update institutional memory.  
• When the decision is made to reuse the software component (leveraging off 
that information in the component specification) within the existing system of 
systems or in another system of systems, the safety analysis (system-of-
systems hazard analysis) is to be repeated with analysis information used to 
update the component specification and subsequently provided to the regulator.  
 
B. CONCLUSION 
To demonstrate how the framework may be applied, a process was chosen and a 
generic avionics software component used as the reusable software component. This 
demonstration provided an example and discussion of how the framework may be applied 











A. KEY FINDINGS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
Software reuse is viewed as a means for achieving rapid system development, 
saving resources and time, and keeping up technologically in an increasingly advancing 
global environment. Reuse offers many benefits and yet much of the software developed 
today is still newly developed but not unique. Much of the problem in making software 
reuse more prevalent is that software was not designed with reuse in mind and that not 
enough readily available information is shared on a software component. Within a safety-
critical system of systems, the demand for information on the software components is 
even greater and more critical.  
At present there is very little guidance in standards on how to best utilize software 
reuse within an industry or in a system of systems. To best utilize software reuse, we 
created a framework to enable reuse within a safety-critical system of systems. That 
framework consists of the enabler made up of organizational factors and three pillars: 
component attributes (quality), component specification (information capture and search 
effectiveness), and safety analysis. Congruence between all framework elements is 
required for software reuse to be a success in a safety-critical system of systems and any 
one element that is not supportive may lead to failure. This research focused on 
developing the framework and describing all elements required for effective reuse. In this 
context more information on a software component is required for reuse due to the 
complexities and potential system configurations. In essence, a system of systems is 
system reuse where existing systems are reused in larger system configurations for 
potentially different missions.  
This research described the attributes of reusable software components, including 
their safety-supportive metrics and how they should be specified, and explored a process 
for performing a system-of-systems hazard analysis. The software component attributes 
are based on well accepted software engineering principles and those metrics that support 
the integration of system safety into the design of the software component. Software-
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safety metrics were identified, ranked according to their importance, and described by 
their relevance in the software life cycle. Component specification expanded on a set of 
models for describing components and provided an abstract description of the software 
component for performing a specification match as well as including all relevant 
information with the component itself. The system-of-systems hazard analysis discussed 
the environment match of the software component that must be supportive of the 
component’s use and be at an acceptable level of mishap risk once treatment strategies 
have been enacted.  
This research leveraged off other efforts to make software reuse more prevalent, 
such as the FAA guidance on reusable software components and the U.S. Navy’s open 
architecture strategy. The FAA guidance was thorough on software reuse but focused on 
collaboration, communication, and product deliverables rather than a systematic approach 
across the entire software life cycle. 
A process then decribed how the framework may be applied to the reuse of a 
generic avionics software component within an aviation system of systems context.   
It is important to realize that it takes a concerted effort and commitment from 
many people to make software reuse a reality, especially in the context of safety-critical 
system of systems. Organizational factors must support reuse across stakeholders; the 
software component must be designed for reuse incorporating those principles and 
properties that support reuse and designing in of quality; the software component must be 
specified accordingly to provide the necessary information and to facilitate more 
effective search (specification matching); and finally the software component must fit the 
proposed deployment environment. Reuse should not blindly occur without consideration 
of the environment in which the system will be deployed.      
B. FUTURE WORK 
One avenue of future work is to refine the specification model with a fully 




and building a better shared understanding by stakeholders. This ontology is likely to be 
domain or system of systems domain specific and may require regulator and stakeholder 
endorsement for its success.  
Additionally, future work could involve developing a case study or the testing of 
the framework in a system of systems setting with the aim of refining its applicability to 
the safety-critical system of systems domain.  
 Further work could also include the development of additional metrics that deal 
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APPENDIX: EXAMPLE SOFTWARE LEVELS OF RIGOR  
A. EXAMPLE SOFTWARE LEVEL OF RIGOR (LOR) MATRIX AND 
REQUIRED LEVEL OF RIGOR SOFTWARE PRODUCTS77  
Hazard 
Severity 
Software Level Autonomy 






















allowing time for 
intervention by 
independent 
safety systems to 
mitigate the 
hazard. However, 









operator action to 
mitigate a hazard. 
Software failures 
will allow or fail 














to complete the 










information of a 
safety critical nature 
used to make safety 
critical decisions.  
There are several, 
redundant, 
independent safety 
measures for each 
hazardous event. 
(IV) Software 










LOR3 LOR3 LOR3 LOR2 LOR2 N/A 
Critical    
(II) 
LOR3 LOR2 LOR2 LOR2 LOR2 N/A 
Marginal 
(III) 
LOR2 LOR2 LOR2 LOR1 LOR1 N/A 
Negligible 
(IV) 
LOR1 LOR1 LOR1 LOR1 LOR1 N/A 
Table 4.   Example Software Level of Rigor Matrix 
                                                 
77 V. Basili., K. Dangle., L. Esker., F. Marotta., Gaining Early Insight into Software Safety: Measures 




Level Of Rigor (LOR) Software Development Products 
LOR 3 – Highest Code Walkthroughs 
 Condition / Decision structural test with safety 
mitigation records 
 All products in lower levels 
LOR 2 Design analysis with updates to requirements 
hazard analysis products 
 Functional hazard analysis 
 Functional testing 
 Stress and stability testing 
 All products in lower levels 
LOR 1 – Lowest Software Safety Requirements 
 Hazard Mitigation Traceability Matrix 
 Functional or system hazard analysis 
 Hazard control Records 
 Computer Program Change Requests 
 System or Functional Testing 







B. SOFTWARE RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX AND SOFTWARE HAZARD 
RISK INDEX78 
 
Hazard Severity Category 
Software Control Category
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible
I 1 1 3 5 
II 1 2 4 5 
III 2 3 5 5 
IV 3 4 5 5 
Table 6.   Software Risk Assessment Matrix 
  
  
Hazard Risk Index Criteria 
1 High Risk: Significant Analysis and Testing resources required. 
2 Medium Risk: Requirements and design Analysis and in-depth testing required. 
3-4 
Moderate Risk: High level analysis and 
testing acceptable with Managing Activity 
approval. 
5 Low Risk: Acceptable. 
 
Table 7.     Software Hazard Risk Index 
                                                 
78 J.B. Michael., SW4582 Weapon System Software Safety Lecture Notes, Naval Postgraduate 
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